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Growth is more inclusive if it creates opportunities 
for wider groups of entrepreneurs to enter the 
growth process, and if it creates a wider range of 
employment opportunities. For a middle-income 
country that is still catching up by attracting 
existing technologies from more advanced 
countries, government policy can affect the 
sectors that are developed by domestic and 
foreign investors. Policy-makers have to ensure 
that the sectors that are supported by policy 
are those that directly or indirectly create the 
widest possible entry opportunities for domestic 
entrepreneurs and workers in the near future, 
and these sectors should also have the maximum 
positive spillovers and linkages with other sectors 
so that further economic development can result 
through these linkages. 
Since policy implementation capacities are 
constrained by the capacities of states to enforce 
the conditions that can ensure that policy support 
is not captured in unproductive ways, policy 
design has to take into account the institutional 
and political constraints of particular countries. In 
particular, effective policies have to be sensible 
in their scope and ambition, and appropriately 
designed in terms of their targets and conditions 
to ensure that the critical components of the 
policy can be realistically implemented. 
Viet Nam faces a number of challenges that 
have to be addressed and overcome for policy 
to become more supportive of sustainable and 
inclusive growth. The first challenge is to identify 
the sectors that are likely to fulfil the conditions 
of rapid entry and employment generation. It is 
not possible to precisely identify the future entry 
and employment conditions associated with 
particular sectors, and indeed it is not necessary 
to achieve a high level of precision in identifying 
specific sectors. More important is to identify the 
‘difficulty’ of particular technologies for domestic 
entrepreneurs and workers, as this is where 
capability constraints constrain inclusive growth. 
This part of the exercise is much easier and it is 
sufficient for policy-makers to identify the likely 
capabilities of domestic firms, entrepreneurs and 
workers in entering particular segments of the 
global value chain. 
Policy should identify the highest levels of likely 
entry given the existing spread of capabilities in 
the country, and then support firms with policies 
that enable them to achieve competitiveness in 
these segments. A simple reliance on attracting 
FDI may not be sufficient for identifying the 
most desirable foreign technologies to attract 
to Viet Nam. Policy should also identify the 
necessary support that has to be provided to 
domestic component manufactures and others 
to maximize the benefit from linkages to FDI, 
which is likely in the first instance to be largely 
based on the assembly of imported components. 
The sustainability of an inclusive growth strategy 
in a relatively small country like Viet Nam requires 
policy-makers to think about what types of FDI to 
attract based on the components that are most 
likely to be sourced out to domestic producers, 
followed with an assessment of the types of 
support policies that can feasibly develop the 
competitiveness and capabilities of the relevant 
domestic producers. This strategy, which is a 
joint strategy for attracting the appropriate FDI 
together with policies of supporting the relevant 
domestic component producing capabilities, 
we describe as a strategy of supporting broad-
based medium technology (components-
manufacturing) sectors.  
To make such a strategy work, attention has to 
be given to a second set of challenges that arise 
from the experience of relatively poor policy 
implementation in the past. The design of policy 
was often inappropriate because support was 
given to organizations with conditions that were 
either inappropriate for ensuring rapid capability 
development, or which could not be enforced. 
Most developing countries have a mixed record 
in supporting capability development in new 
sectors, particularly because of these types 
of implementation failures. However, we also 
know that by changing the design of policies 
Executive Summary
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and providing support in a different way or to 
different types of firms, significantly better results 
were often achieved. This is an important lesson 
that Vietnamese policy-makers can learn about 
the design of ‘rent-management strategies’.
Finally, policy-makers also have to operate 
with a more limited policy space. Many policy 
instruments like tariffs and some subsidies are 
being phased out as a result of joining the WTO, 
and policy space may contract further once the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and other trade 
and investment agreements become effective. 
This is a constraint, but not as serious a constraint 
as is often thought. Many of the instruments that 
are being phased out did not work effectively in 
the past anyway, and redesigning these policies 
to make them more effective may be difficult. 
The challenge will be to design new policies 
using instruments that are allowed by the new 
agreements. Our aim here is not to identify the 
precise intermediate technology components 
sectors to support, or suggest very detailed 
policies. Rather, our aim is to identify the policy 
challenges that Viet Nam faces, and the types of 
sectors, policies and policy designs that are likely 
to work. 
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I. Introduction 
Viet Nam has made tremendous progress over the 
last two decades in raising living standards and 
reducing poverty. However, growth rates and the 
rates of poverty reduction have been slowing. The 
challenge Viet Nam faces now is not just to sustain 
growth in the context of a global slowdown, but 
also to ensure that growth is inclusive. 
Growth is more inclusive the more it allows 
citizens to participate in, contribute to and 
benefit from growth, regardless of their individual 
circumstances. From a policy perspective, 
governments can ensure that growth is more 
inclusive by supporting the development of 
new sectors that create entrepreneurial and 
employment opportunities across broader 
segments of society. To be sustainable, these 
strategies have to ensure the eventual 
emergence of competitive firms and activities 
that can survive beyond the policy support 
that helped them emerge. 
Box 1   Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the Growth of Competitive 
Domestic Firms
Since the 1980s, the growth of competitive domestic firms in many developing countries has 
been closely linked to strategies of attracting FDI. However, the evidence shows that FDI by 
itself does not necessarily result in sustainable and inclusive growth. The positive effects of 
FDI can be significantly reduced if it crowds out domestic investors or makes it more difficult 
for domestic investors to develop their capabilities and competitiveness. In other words, FDI 
can either ‘crowd in’ or ‘crowd out’ domestic investments. Unfortunately, crowding out has 
happened in various periods and regions, including in particular in Latin America (Agosin 
& Machado, 2005). In several East European countries, like Hungary, Poland and the Czech 
Republic, high technology automotive and electronics investments have not always resulted 
in significant opportunities for components production by domestic companies. This has 
constrained inclusive growth and created dualistic economies that have become dependent 
on the locational decisions of a few multinational companies (Pavlínek, 2004). This type of 
duality in the domestic economy as a result of FDI has also been observed in several East 
Asian high-growth economies where FDI has not interlocked very well with the development 
of domestic component production capabilities. This is the case, for example, in both the 
Thai and the Indonesian automobile sectors that are heavily dependent on the strategies of 
Japanese companies and the development of competitive domestic components production 
has been relatively slow (Irawati & Rutten, 2014; Khan, 2012b).
In contrast, in countries where FDI has generated significant subsidiary employment 
and entrepreneurial opportunities, this has been through the development of domestic 
productive capabilities in linked firms. An interesting paradox is that at least initially, lower 
technology domestic producers are most likely to be able to supply components to foreign 
invested enterprises. This is because lower technology domestic manufacturers are most likely 
to be able to achieve sufficiently high competitiveness and product quality in their segment 
to competitively integrate into the production chains of multinationals. In contrast, higher 
technology domestic component suppliers may face a bigger gap in competitiveness against 
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competing international suppliers and are likely to be squeezed out. Not surprisingly, the 
countries that have benefited most from FDI are those that have been able to have 
supportive policies for the development of linked domestic capabilities, initially at 
fairly low levels of technological sophistication. This allows domestic firms to rapidly 
enter into the supply chains of foreign invested enterprises and the ability to produce 
competitively also enables these domestic component suppliers to grow further by directly 
exporting into global markets. China has arguably been one of the most successful countries 
in achieving inclusive growth through FDI using such a strategy. In China, FDI was associated 
with a significant improvement in the competitiveness of domestic enterprises (measured by 
manufacturing value added per capita and manufacturing exports per capita), but even as 
late as 2005-2010 the improvement in competitiveness of Chinese domestic firms was most 
dramatic for lower technology firms (Zhang, 2014). In the longer term, the fact that China has 
developed such a broad range of organizational capabilities in thousands of low to medium-
technology firms in different sectors means that many of these firms are likely to succeed in 
organically moving up the technology ladder, and that is indeed happening now. 
In other words, China’s success in employment generation and poverty reduction through FDI 
was associated with the dramatic growth of competitive labour-intensive domestic component 
firms that created massive employment opportunities. The growth of these firms was not 
accidental but the result of appropriate government policies supporting the development of 
domestic firms in different technology segments. These policies included preferential interest 
and tax rates for targeted sectors, trade protection and pricing policies and direct government 
financing (Lu, 2000). The success of particular instruments depends on the overall market, 
institutional and political context, and so Chinese policy instruments cannot necessarily be 
replicated by other countries. Nevertheless, the general principles underlying the success of 
China’s inclusive growth strategy are of broader applicability. Indeed, the general proposition 
that access to foreign technology and finance through FDI has beneficial effects for domestic 
firms, applies only if the latter have the technological and organizational capacity to benefit 
from these linkages. This is supported by evidence from many other countries, for instance, India 
(Siddhartan & Lal, 2004), Ethiopia (Seyoum, Wu, & Yang, 2015) and Bangladesh (Khan, 2013a). 
International evidence suggests that FDI can assist inclusive growth strategies, 
provided i) the type of FDI is such that it creates significant opportunities for 
domestic companies to benefit as suppliers or otherwise gain from spillovers 
and ii) there are complementary government policies enabling a large number 
of domestic companies to develop their capabilities to competitively engage in 
these roles. 
Many policies for supporting the emergence of 
new sectors and firms in Viet Nam have performed 
poorly in the past because they failed to ensure 
the emergence of competitive firms that could 
survive without the initial policy support. 
As Box 1 shows, in developing countries, the 
sectors that are most likely to drive inclusive 
growth are medium technology sectors that 
are intermediate in terms of capital-intensity 
and technological sophistication. Compared to 
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high-technology sectors, these sectors require 
less capital and generate more employment 
and are more likely to achieve competitiveness 
in global markets. At the same time, compared 
to very low-technology or informal sectors, 
they offer higher wages and the potential of 
higher productivity growth. 
Medium technology sectors include many of 
the industry clusters that serve as ‘supporting 
industries’ providing inputs and components to 
more sophisticated final product producers and 
assemblers, who are nowadays likely to be global 
multinational companies or FDI investors within 
the country. Without local clusters of supporting 
industries, higher technology sectors dominated 
by multinationals will either not arrive, or if 
they do, they are likely to import most of their 
required components from abroad, with limited 
creation of local employment and entrepreneurial 
opportunities. For an inclusive growth strategy 
in countries like Viet Nam, the active promotion 
of competitive medium-technology sectors, 
particularly in component producing clusters, is 
likely to be essential. 
The development of competitive capabilities in 
new sectors, including medium technology ones, 
requires addressing several ‘contracting failures’ 
(market failures) that can constrain investments in 
these new sectors. Many of these market failures 
are well known but policy can be inadequate as a 
result of two types of problems: 
•	 First, policy may have limited effects if 
it targets the wrong or less important 
market failures. In particular, policy in 
developing countries often fails to address 
the market failures constraining investments 
in developing technical and organizational 
capabilities in firms. These capabilities 
are critical for ensuring the emergence of 
competitiveness but are also extremely 
difficult to develop through investments 
organized by private contracting alone. 
•	 Secondly, even when policies address 
important market failures, the policy 
design may be such that the necessary 
conditions for success cannot be enforced 
given the political and institutional 
environment of the country. 
We describe the second as a  ‘rent management 
problem’. Any policy support provided to firms 
to encourage the development of new areas 
of competitiveness creates new streams of 
income for the supported stakeholders that can 
be described as ‘rents’. However, competitive 
firms are only likely to emerge if the allocation 
of these rents is conditional on the recipients 
meeting specific conditions. If these conditions 
are not properly identified or enforced, outcomes 
are likely to be poor (see Box 2). The capacity of 
a state to identify and enforce the conditions 
necessary for the success of particular policies can 
be described as the rent management capabilities 
of that state with respect to the implementation 
of those particular policies. All states are not 
equally good at enforcing all types of conditions. 
The policy challenge is to devise policies whose 
conditions for success are potentially enforceable 
by a particular state, given the specific institutional 
and political constraints it faces.
Box 2    Technology Policies Compared: India and South Korea 
The success of  ‘technology policies’ (sometimes described as industrial policies) that developed 
new sectors and capabilities in South Korea is well known, but very similar strategies fared 
less well in other countries like India and Pakistan. The dual problem of targeting the most 
important market failures and ensuring that the policy is effectively implemented can explain 
these significant differences in outcomes. 
In India, many years of planning and protection did build up capabilities in different sectors 
but not fast enough to develop globally competitive sectors. This was partly because 
the dominant instruments of licensing and planning primarily attempted to coordinate 
investments in leading strategic sectors and did not address the much more important 
problems of developing the competitiveness of firms. The most important problem in India 
at that time was that firms in all sectors lacked the technical and organizational capabilities 
for achieving international competitiveness. This is still the most important problem in many
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developing countries. Some industrial policy instruments in India, like tariff protection 
and other implicit subsidies did indeed provide resources to firms to engage in capability 
development. These instruments allowed learning-by-doing as firms engaged in production 
in new sectors. The automobile, iron and steel, and engineering sectors in India developed 
considerable capabilities during the 1950s and 1960s as a result. 
Capabilities, however, did not develop fast enough for most of these sectors to achieve global 
competitiveness. This part of the failure was due to policy design being inappropriate for the 
political and institutional conditions in India. Indian firms receiving these types of support 
proved to be very difficult to discipline and the state could not withdraw subsidies from firms 
that failed to achieve competitiveness (Chibber, 2003; Khan, 2011). As a result, Indian firms did 
not face credible compulsions to increase their productivity, productivity growth was slow and 
policies supporting capability development eventually began to be abandoned in the 1980s. 
In contrast, the instruments providing support to emerging firms in South Korea had credible 
conditions that firms knew they had to fulfil, otherwise they would lose their subsidies. These 
conditions, including export targets, could be enforced in the political and institutional 
conditions of contemporary South Korea, and companies that failed to achieve targets actually 
lost their subsidies. 
The challenge for countries like India (and Viet Nam) is to construct policy instruments that 
address the most important problems constraining the emergence of competitive sectors, and 
to provide the support with conditions that can be enforced in their political and institutional 
contexts. We argue that this is possible, but requires a rethinking of the policy-making process. 
The experience of policy implementation in Viet 
Nam suggests that the design of policy aiming to 
upgrade productive capabilities has in many cases 
ignored the actual implementation capacities 
(rent management capacities) of the state. In 
this sense, the Vietnamese experience is closer 
to that of countries like India (Box 2), as many 
supported firms and sectors did not become 
competitive, suggesting that appropriate and 
credible conditions could not be imposed on the 
firms receiving support. 
Viet Nam has had a variety of policies to promote 
technology acquisition and competitiveness in 
different sectors. Some of these policies have 
arguably encouraged investments and growth 
in some sectors but there has been more limited 
success in promoting the development of 
new competitive firms and sectors that could 
sustainably drive growth beyond the period of 
policy support. The paper discusses why the 
emergence of competitive sectors has been slow 
and the ways in which policy may respond to 
these challenges. 
Outline of Report
•	 In Section II we discuss the conditions 
that effective policies supporting inclusive 
growth must satisfy. 
•	 In Section III we discuss the most important 
‘contracting’ or market failures that constrain 
the emergence of competitive industries. 
Of these, a particularly important one is 
the difficulty of organizing investments 
in learning-by-doing to develop the firm-
level capabilities required for competitive 
production. 
•	 In Section IV we discuss some specific 
characteristics of Viet Nam’s institutional 
and political context that have constrained 
particular types of policies and enforcement 
strategies. 
•	 Section V discusses some of the experiences 
of policy implementation in the garments 
and textiles, automobiles and electronics 
sectors in Viet Nam. 
•	 Section VI draws the discussion together 
to look at some of the policy options for 
supporting inclusive growth in Viet Nam. 
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Inclusive growth requires policies that can help 
a wide range of competitive sectors to develop, 
creating new entrepreneurial opportunities 
employment growth and rising wages. The 
types of technologies that are most likely to 
do this can be broadly described as ‘medium’ 
or intermediate technologies, that are neither 
very capital- and skill-intensive, so that access 
is not limited to very few entrepreneurs and 
workers nor so low-tech as to generate very 
low wages and wage growth. Clearly, the 
industries included in medium technology sectors 
are likely to be different in countries at different 
stages of development. In a rising middle-income 
country like Viet Nam, a wide variety of sectors 
and technologies can be in the intermediate 
technology sectors, including a wide variety of 
component industries in electronics, engineering 
and automotive parts, but also advanced 
garments and textiles. 
Supportive policies are required for promoting 
these sectors if private initiatives are not resulting 
in their rapid growth. The reasons that may 
constrain private initiatives in these activities 
can be broadly described as contracting or 
market failures. If the development of some 
sectors and technologies can add net benefit 
to a society, and if the resources necessary are 
potentially available, the failure of these sectors 
to develop is likely to be due to various types 
of contracting failures. Investors and other 
stakeholders are only likely to engage in these 
activities if they can ensure that the conditions 
required to make their investments profitable 
can be enforced. If not, the investments will not 
be forthcoming. It is important to identify the 
precise reasons behind these contracting 
failures because the design of the policy 
support can be quite different for different 
problems. 
There are two broad types of policies for 
addressing market failures affecting the 
development of new businesses. Both are 
sometimes referred to as technology policies or 
industrial policies. ‘Horizontal’ policies attempt 
to improve general conditions for doing 
business by improving the efficiency of markets 
and contracting and improving the supply 
of critical public goods and infrastructure. 
The aim is reduce market failures for all business 
sectors. But in general, and in particular in 
developing countries, many market failures are 
likely to remain even after the implementation 
of horizontal policies supporting business. As 
a result, successful countries have in addition 
had ‘vertical’ or targeted technology policies 
that addressed particular contracting failures 
affecting investments in particular sectors or 
technologies (see Box 3) (Khan & Blankenburg, 
2009). Vertical policies are sometimes wrongly 
criticized for being discriminatory or involving 
judgements about ‘picking winners’. In fact, the 
distinction between the two is not very sharp, 
and the real distinction is about the effectiveness 
and relevance of the policy framework for solving 
particular problems.
Box 3    Horizontal versus Targeted Policies for Promoting Business 
Examples of horizontal policies for promoting business include improving the conditions for 
‘doing business’ as defined by the World Bank measurement of the ease of doing business in 
different countries (World Bank & International Finance Corporation, 2013).  Most developing 
countries have strategies of improving these conditions, including reduction of red tape, 
II. Policies for Developing     
    Competitiveness in New Sectors 
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simplifying procedures for registration of businesses, paying taxes, getting utility connections, 
and so on. In principle these measures reduce the costs of setting up and operating businesses, 
and should therefore help new businesses to start up. 
However, these strategies are rarely sufficient for ensuring sustained growth in developing 
countries. Different sectors and businesses typically face very specific problems, and policies 
that address these specific problems are targeted policies. Developing countries therefore 
typically also have targeted/vertical policies for promoting business that address problems 
facing particular sectors or types of firms. More successful countries are typically more 
successful in designing and implementing vertical policies, and this explains why they are 
more successful in sequentially developing new firms and sectors and thereby spreading 
growth. Examples include South Korea’s policies providing subsidized finance and export 
subsidies to export-oriented sectors and chaebol in the 1960s, or China’s policies providing 
cheap credit, targeted infrastructure and tax breaks to particular sectors identified in industrial 
policy priorities from 1989 onwards (Amsden, 1989; Lu, 2000). A country’s capacity to design 
and implement targeted support policies is therefore critical for sustaining growth. 
One argument for horizontal policies is that they are non-discriminatory and therefore do 
not involve policy-makers making judgements for or against prioritizing particular sectors. In 
reality, this argument does not hold because all policies discriminate in favour of or against 
particular individuals, sectors or firms in some way. For instance, even apparently horizontal 
policies are actually discriminatory if firms or sectors face very different constraints, and if 
the horizontal policy ignores these differences. A policy that fails to recognize differences 
in the types and intensities of problems across sectors is effectively discriminating against 
sectors with more severe problems. Conversely, policies that identify priorities across sectors 
or regions and then sequentially address them may help to create a more level playing field 
over time. In that sense, they may actually be more ‘non-discriminatory’. Note that horizontal 
policies are not necessarily ‘picking winners’, they may simply be sequentially addressing 
sector-specific constraints. Obviously not all problems, whether they are general or particular, 
can be feasibly addressed by policy. The real question is whether the priorities identified 
can be effectively addressed.
Clearly, some policies are more horizontal in the distribution of benefits across firms and 
others are more targeted and therefore more vertical. Truly horizontal policies that do not 
discriminate between any firms or sectors are difficult to imagine, and highly targeted 
strategies that benefit very few firms are likely to be captured and may be strongly 
opposed by other interests in society. The relevant choices are likely to be between policies 
located in the middle of the horizontal–vertical spectrum. When we look at this range, there 
are no compelling theoretical reasons why policies that are somewhat more ‘horizontal’ will 
always perform better in terms of social objectives like supporting inclusive growth. The 
experience of successful technology policy in countries like South Korea and Taiwan shows 
that they sequentially targeted specific technologies, regions, and contracting problems. 
These policies ranged from the industrial policy instruments of South Korea and Taiwan in
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the 1960s and 1970s that targeted particular sectors and industries, to the region-specific 
incentives and provincial competition in China in the 1980s and beyond (Amsden, 1989; 
Qian, 2003; Qian & Weingast, 1997; Wade, 1988, 1990; World Bank, 1993). The distinguishing 
characteristics of successful policies were that they identified and targeted the most 
important problems, and were implementable and enforceable in their political and 
institutional contexts. 
It is important to point out that successful policies for developing competitive sectors do 
not require states with the vision and the capacity for ‘picking winners’. This metaphor is 
unfortunate because it implies that successful technology policy requires wise bureaucrats 
whose vision of the future is particularly prescient. Since bureaucrats and politicians clearly do 
not have such abilities, it may be wrongly concluded that targeted government support for 
inclusive growth policies is best avoided. The reality is that even the dramatically successful 
East Asian countries did not have such bureaucrats. The difference was rather that the policy 
instruments that emerged in East Asia could be enforced in their specific political contexts, 
and could be altered in the light of evidence. This enabled mistakes to be corrected and new 
experiments to be initiated. 
The effectiveness of policy depends on two 
interrelated questions. First, does it identify 
the right problems and secondly, is the design 
of the policy appropriate for the political and 
institutional context of the country? The first 
question in turn has several dimensions. First, 
policies can fail simply because policy-makers 
have multiple objectives and may be attempting 
to achieve too many goals with a limited set of 
instruments. For instance, a policy that aims to 
achieve competitiveness through productivity 
growth can fail if policy-makers also want to 
protect employment in the firms and sectors being 
targeted. Multiple objectives require packages of 
policies targeting different problems because of 
these types of trade-offs. If productivity growth 
requires a particular firm to lose some employees, 
other policies should support the relocation 
and retraining of affected workers and support 
the development of alternative employment 
opportunities. 
A more important aspect of the first question is 
that many different types of contracting failures 
can constrain the emergence of competitiveness 
in new sectors. Policies that may have been 
appropriate if the constraint was due to one set 
of problems may be inappropriate if the more 
important problem was a different one. For 
instance, policies that target insufficient skills 
may be irrelevant and even wasteful if the main 
problem was that firms lacked the organizational 
capability to achieve competitiveness. These 
problems may also be quite difficult to identify 
using simple survey techniques. If firms are failing 
to achieve competitiveness because they have 
low internal organizational capabilities, their 
managers may be unaware of the problem or 
unwilling to admit to it, and instead they may be 
very likely to attribute their low competitiveness 
to poor worker skills or other constraints. But if 
low firm-level organizational capabilities were 
the more important problem, the expenditure 
of public resources in skills training may end up 
creating an additional problem of unemployed 
skilled labour on top of the already existing 
problem of uncompetitive firms. Policy-makers 
therefore clearly need to have a careful 
analysis of the causes of low competitiveness 
because superficial assessments and survey 
evidence may be misleading.
The second problem is that technology policies 
can also fail even if the problems have been 
correctly identified, if the particular instruments 
chosen to address these turn out to be ineffective 
in the political and social context. This problem 
has resulted in many failures in Asian industrial 
policy. Every society has a specific economic and 
political structure that can be described by the 
capabilities and the distribution of power across 
different types of organizations. The relative 
bargaining power of different types of firms, 
government agencies, and other stakeholders 
can vary greatly across countries given their 
initial conditions. We describe the distribution of 
organizational power as the ‘political settlement’ 
of the country (Khan, 1995, 2010). Features of the 
political settlement matter for the enforcement 
of technology policy because policy typically 
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provides explicit or implicit policy support (rents) 
to particular firms or sectors conditional on the 
achievement of desired outcomes. The results of 
the technology policy (or indeed of any policy in 
general) depends critically on how effectively the 
state can monitor the outcome that is desired, and 
change the allocation and terms of support in the 
light of emerging results. Case study evidence 
shows that the effectiveness of monitoring 
and enforcement depends only partly on 
the technical capabilities of state agencies 
doing the enforcement and much more on the 
relative bargaining power of these agencies 
vis-à-vis the types of firms receiving the rents 
(Khan, 2009, 2013a; Khan & Blankenburg, 2009; 
Ngo, 2013).
Cases of policy failure of this type are generically 
described as government failures. Liberal 
economists have argued, often justifiably, 
that targeted technology policies should be 
abandoned because the costs of the government 
failure may be more significant than the market 
failures they were trying to address (Krueger, 
1990). Indeed, experiences with failed strategies 
of supporting particular firms and sectors in 
Viet Nam have sometimes also led to voices 
arguing against support policies and in favour 
of greater reliance on free trade agreements to 
drive the development of competitiveness in 
the country. This type of reasoning has led some 
policy-makers and economists to support the 
WTO, the TPP and other free trade agreements, for 
instance as ways of reducing the discrimination 
against domestic private firms (Perkins & Vu-
Thanh, 2011). As a response to inefficient rent 
capture, this type of policy response is very 
understandable, but inadequate. Clearly, if some 
support policies have been wasteful they should 
be abandoned or modified. However, if we 
simply abandon vertical support policies and rely 
entirely on horizontal support policies, important 
market failures may remain and may prevent a 
broad-based development of competitiveness. 
The only feasible option is actually to redesign 
targeted policies better, with greater attention 
to implementation conditions. This does not 
preclude support for measures that also seek to 
increase competition and trade.  
The two related but logically separate steps 
in effective policy design are summarized in 
Figure 1. Policies can fail if either the policy 
design ignores the most important market 
failures constraining the achievement of 
competitiveness or the policy design delivers 
rents to organizations with conditions that 
cannot actually be credibly enforced in that 
political and institutional context. Both types of 
problems can potentially be addressed by better 
policy design. 
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Figure 1   Two Necessary Steps in Effective Policy Design
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Using the framework outlined in Figure 1, we 
now look at the different problems constraining 
the emergence of competitive firms and sectors, 
and what policy can do to address these 
problems. In this section we look at the different 
problems (market failures) that may constrain 
the development of new firms and sectors, and 
in the next section we look at the problem of 
policy design for effective implementation in 
different political contexts. While there are many 
potential problems that affect the development 
of competitive new medium technology sectors, 
such as missing skills, the problem of coordinating 
investments across sectors and so on, we argue 
that the problem of developing firm-level 
organizational capabilities is a particularly 
important constraint that has not been 
sufficiently recognized in policy design. We 
look at the more important market failures in turn.
1. Investments in Formal Skills 
The difficulty of achieving competitiveness 
in many sectors is often attributed to the low 
levels of skills of the workforce. Investments in 
training and skills may in turn be constrained 
by market failures if investments in skills are 
subject to positive externalities. This can justify 
various public policies of supporting investments 
in skills. The market failure is that the private 
investor in skills cannot capture enough of the 
benefits from this investment and the result is 
under-investment. For instance, if employers 
are considering investing in the skills of their 
workforce, they may fear that workers may not 
remain with the firm for long enough to enable 
the firm to recover its investments through 
higher productivity. Contracting with workers to 
stay with the firm for a number of years after the 
training may be difficult to enforce, and this may 
make firms unwilling to invest in skills to the full 
extent. Similarly, workers too may not want to 
invest in skills that are of benefit to a particular 
employer because employers may not be able 
to offer a credible contract keeping them in their 
jobs for long enough and at a high enough wage, 
and the particular skills may not be equally valued 
by other employers. The majority of employers 
surveyed by the World Bank in Viet Nam identified 
skills gaps and skills shortages as a constraint 
(World Bank, 2013).
If the absence of skills is an important problem 
in a sector, the obvious policy response is to 
share some of the training costs or provide 
training through publicly funded training 
organizations. The first problem is therefore 
to identify whether the absence of skills is 
indeed an important problem in a sector. 
This may be quite difficult to determine in many 
cases. If employers facing low competitiveness 
are surveyed, they are very likely to attribute their 
problems to low worker skills. But they may not 
necessarily be right. Skills shortages may not 
be the primary cause of low productivity and 
competitiveness in many sectors. In every sector 
there are likely to be particular gaps in formal 
skills, for instance in areas like accountancy, 
engineering and computing. But the more 
general problem for developing countries is that 
even workers who have the appropriate formal 
skills still register low productivity because the 
employing firms do not have the ‘organizational 
capabilities’ to organize high productivity 
production. These organizational capabilities are 
also skills in a broad sense, but they are tacit ‘skills’ 
that are embedded in organizational routines, 
and the production team cannot learn these 
skills in formal training programs. We discuss this 
constraint separately later. 
We know from international evaluations of 
training programmes in developing countries 
that it is difficult to ensure that they produce 
higher productivity employees at the end. For 
instance, a World Bank review of a large number 
of evaluations of training programmes concluded 
that training programmes generally did not have 
a high impact on raising wages (a measure of 
increased productivity) though there was some 
impact on employment. But performance was even 
III. Market Failures Constraining the  
     Development of Competitiveness 
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poorer in developing countries. In all cases, on-
the-job training and employer involvement was 
critical for achieving success, which is consistent 
with our argument about the importance of 
tacit skills acquired through learning-by-doing 
(Betcherman, Olivas, & Dar, 2004, p. 53). In the 
sectoral Vietnamese case studies in this paper we 
found evidence consistent with these findings 
about the difficulty of organizing effective formal 
training programmes, for instance in the garments 
industry.
Two points need to be kept in mind when 
designing policies for skills development. First, 
as already mentioned, the most pressing skill 
deficit in developing countries is usually the 
absence of tacit knowledge embedded at 
different levels of an organization about how to 
efficiently organize production processes. This is 
typically not an individual skill and not one that 
can be easily remedied through formal training. It 
should not be confused with ‘management’ skills, 
if the latter is understood as formal skills taught 
in management schools. Firms have to develop 
their organizational functions along different 
dimensions to maximize the speed with which 
inputs are converted into outputs, ensure that 
waste is minimized, product quality maintained, 
and so on. The processes for enhancing these 
tacit organizational skills are very different from 
those required for enhancing formal skills. The 
first requires the financing of on-the-job training 
and experimentation with organizational design, 
the second requires formal training in appropriate 
educational establishments. Secondly, in the 
absence of appropriate strategies for enhancing 
tacit knowledge, strategies for enhancing formal 
skills are likely to result in increased skilled 
unemployment and perhaps an out-migration of 
skilled workers. 
Most manufacturing processes in developing 
countries actually require fairly basic prior 
knowledge of the technology of production by 
the majority of the workforce. This is true for blue 
collar workers in sectors like textiles, electronics 
and light-to-moderately-heavy engineering. 
What is often required is not the acquisition 
of formal skills through training in external 
institutes (though this can help to some extent), 
but the development of the productivity of the 
workforce by making the production team 
work together in a more organized way. These 
tacit capabilities can only be learned through 
firm-level experimentation with different 
organizational structures, supervisory 
structures, incentive structures and so on. 
Developing countries often make the mistake of 
responding to low competitiveness by assuming 
that the problem can be solved by investing 
more in formal skills training, only to find that 
the expected improvements in productivity and 
competitiveness do not materialize. Indeed, one 
of the paradoxes of developing countries is 
that they regularly export skilled workers who 
could not be competitively employed in their 
own countries, but whose productivity jumps 
by orders of magnitude once they join a firm in 
a more competitive country or region (Clark & 
Wolcott, 2012). 
The answer to the paradox of migration is that 
workers have low productivity in their home 
countries or regions because firms do not have 
the organizational capabilities and routines for 
organizing efficient production. But as soon as 
these workers migrate and join an efficiently run 
organization in another country or region, they 
quickly learn the required organizational routines 
on the job (by observing other workers) and their 
productivity jumps several times, showing that 
the problem was in many cases not the absence 
of formal training, but of knowledge and know-
how of a different kind. Clark and Wolcott (2012) 
report productivity differences of more than 600 
percent between workers in the United States and 
India who have similar formal skills and who are 
using identical machinery! 
Differences of this magnitude cannot be due to 
the skills of individual workers and show that the 
organization is not using its workforce effectively. 
If aggregate output is low because of wastage 
of inputs, downtime of machinery, rejection 
of output because of poor quality, stoppages 
because of poor inventory or order management, 
all these show up as low productivity of workers 
but it does not mean these problems can be 
addressed with greater investments in skills. 
We cannot always deduce from the low 
measured productivity of workers that they 
lack specific skills that can be taught through 
a training programme. The problem may 
instead be a missing set of tacit skills informing 
the organization of production, and these have 
to be acquired through learning-by-doing. We 
will discuss this constraint later. Of course, once 
competitive sectors begin to take off, formal skills 
shortages of specific types soon emerge that have 
to be addressed. Indeed, for some categories of 
formal skills, such as accountancy, computing 
skills or mechanical engineering, there may be 
genuine shortages even at the initial stages of 
sectoral development, depending on the types 
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of industrial processes being attempted. The 
first step in the diagnosis suggested in Figure 1 
for this particular problem is therefore to assess 
the extent to which specific skills shortages are 
actually the problem. This would involve going 
beyond the perceptions of managers and would 
involve looking at the formal skills of workers in 
more competitive firms both within the country 
and internationally, focusing on countries at 
similar levels of development. The aim would be 
to empirically examine if higher productivity firms 
did actually have workers with significantly higher 
levels of formal skills, and in which areas. 
It is clear from the World Bank’s Skilling up Viet 
Nam report that there are formal skills shortages 
in particular areas, particularly for more advanced 
technicians (World Bank, 2013, p. 53). The World 
Bank study found that these formal skills shortages 
have been difficult to address because of poor 
information about where specific skills gaps 
exist, weak incentives on the part of students and 
workers to acquire these skills and weak capacity 
on the part of educational establishments to meet 
these needs (World Bank, 2013, pp. 116-128). 
However, the World Bank’s approach in that report 
is a holistic one, looking at how the educational 
system from the primary level onwards needs to 
be reoriented for a modern market economy. Our 
concern is to identify immediate constraints on 
employment generation. If we accurately identify 
that part of the problem of low competitiveness 
in a sector is indeed the absence of specific formal 
skills, the second step in terms of Figure 1 is to 
examine whether proposed policies for formal 
skills development link the support provided 
to the achievement of success and government 
agencies have the capacity to enforce appropriate 
conditions on the organizations receiving 
support. This requires a careful consideration of 
the monitoring and enforcement requirements 
of that particular policy given the enforcement 
capacities of government agencies in that 
country. Policy support for training programmes 
can be delivered in different ways, with rents 
being allocated to different types of organizations 
and the success of each depends on the capacity 
of the state to enforce the appropriate conditions 
for that particular policy. 
This argument can be illustrated by considering 
different types of skills support programmes. 
One possibility is to provide financial support or 
tax breaks directly to firms investing in training. 
This is one way of delivering the required ‘rents’ 
but this policy will fail if firms provide poor 
quality training after receiving support or use the 
support to reduce their costs without providing 
much training. Support for skills using this policy 
instrument will only be effective if training 
outcomes can be clearly defined and monitored 
and if appropriate penalties can be imposed on 
firms if they fail to meet these conditions. Policy 
can fail if the conditions are not clearly defined 
or if the monitoring and enforcement agencies 
have insufficient enforcement capabilities vis-
à-vis the types of firms being supported. Clearly 
in some contexts this method of supporting 
skills is unlikely to be effective and alternative 
mechanisms have to be considered. A second 
possibility is to subsidize training institutes 
providing the relevant training so that workers 
or employers can access the relevant training at 
a much lower cost or for free. For this strategy to 
succeed, government agencies have to be able 
to identify the courses that have a market value 
for future employers and they have to monitor 
the quality of teaching with penalties for training 
institutes that fail to meet these criteria. Again, 
appropriate criteria for success and failure have 
to be identified, outcomes have to be monitored 
and incentives and penalties effectively applied. 
This too may be more or less feasible in different 
contexts, given the capabilities and bargaining 
power of training institutes and the agencies 
charged with monitoring them. Other policy 
alternatives include providing training subsidies 
directly to employees, or setting up training 
institutes under public ownership. Each of these 
solutions has specific conditions that need to 
be monitored and enforced. The most effective 
policy design will depend on the conditions 
that are most likely to be enforceable in a 
particular context, given the characteristics of 
the organizations involved and the enforcement 
capabilities of government agencies. 
2. Innovation and Accessing  
    Advanced Technologies
Investment in innovation and the acquisition 
of technologies embodying innovation may be 
constrained if intellectual property cannot be 
protected. The problem here is that innovation can 
be imitated and, if this happens too rapidly, the 
innovator could earn an insufficient return, which 
may deter further investments in innovation, or 
reduce the willingness of innovators to allow their 
technologies to be used in particular countries. 
Private contracting solutions to prevent imitation 
are unlikely to be effective and this contracting 
failure requires effective public policies. There is 
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an extensive literature on how this contracting 
failure can be addressed by protecting intellectual 
property rights, which results in extra profits 
for innovators known as Schumpeterian or 
technology rents (Dosi, 1988; Khan, 2000). The 
implications of preventing imitation are obviously 
different for innovators, imitators and consumers. 
Longer periods of protection benefit innovators 
but hurt consumers and developing countries 
attempting to move up the technology ladder. 
So there is a trade-off between the benefits of 
faster innovation that comes from protecting the 
returns of innovators and the losses of consumers 
and developing countries attempting to catch 
up. This means there is an optimal period of 
protection of technology rents, and the optimal 
period may vary across sectors and technologies. 
It is also recognized that excessively long periods 
of protection can actually slow down the pace 
of innovation by making it difficult for new 
innovators to build on previous innovations 
(Stiglitz, 2007, pp. 103-132). 
While advanced countries largely rely on 
innovation to drive growth, a significant part of 
growth in developing countries is based on the 
adoption and adaptation of existing technologies. 
Although innovation is undoubtedly taking 
place in many developing countries, most of 
their growth comes from adopting and adapting 
already existing technologies. East Asia’s high 
growth in the 1960s and 1970s was based on 
the rapid transfer and imitation of existing 
technologies. The emergence of trade-related 
aspects of intellectual property rights under the 
World Trade Organization and other intellectual 
property rights protection agreements have 
affected this process of adoption by slowing 
down the pace at which imitation can take place, 
and ruling out the imitation of the most advanced 
technologies. Given the international governance 
architecture protecting technology rents, such as 
the 1994 agreement on trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property rights (TRIPS), developing 
countries have to credibly protect intellectual 
property rights if they want to attract global 
companies to invest (Hoekman, Maskus, & Saggi, 
2004). 
Over the longer term, however, intellectual 
property rights agreements have made 
technology transfers to domestic companies 
more difficult and this could constrain broad-
based national development (Cimoli, Coriat, 
& Primi, 2009; Stiglitz, 2007). In the long run, 
developing countries may have to revisit the 
appropriateness of these agreements. But in the 
immediate future, developing countries may have 
no option but to protect intellectual property 
rights to be able to attract foreign investments. 
The policy question under these conditions is 
about the types of foreign investments that the 
developing country should invite. Given that any 
direct imitation of the technology is precluded 
by intellectual property rights agreements, 
the developing country should ask whether 
the technology in question allows backward 
and forward linkages to domestic medium-
technology firms as subcontractors and 
component suppliers. If the foreign technology 
is so advanced or so tightly controlled in terms of 
its international supply chain that there are limited 
spillovers to domestic medium-technology firms, 
this may not be the best type of technology to 
attract. These considerations are relevant for 
Viet Nam in several sectors including electronics 
where the higher end foreign investments 
may be so advanced that there are limited 
opportunities for domestic spillovers. These links 
between government policies that aim to attract 
particular types of FDI, with government policies 
that develop appropriate levels of local firm 
capabilities were discussed in Box 1.
The policy questions here in terms of Figure 
1 are first to determine the extent to which 
there are impediments to the attraction of 
the most desirable technologies, and then 
to devise policies that are most likely to be 
effective in the spread of these technologies to 
create inclusive growth. Innovation and frontier 
technologies are unlikely to be the dominant 
drivers of growth in middle income countries like 
Viet Nam. The policy question is to select the 
advanced technologies that have the biggest 
potential of supporting the development of 
medium-technology component suppliers 
in the country concerned. This means that 
the policy position cannot just be to protect 
intellectual property rights. The more important 
policy question is about the appropriate higher 
technology investments that a country like 
Viet Nam should promote, and this should be 
determined by identifying the linkages between 
particular high technology investments and 
feasible developments of medium-technology 
component providing clusters in the local 
economy. The latter could contribute to the goal 
of inclusive growth. 
Policy should then focus on how to 
provide additional incentives to the 
high-technology sectors that can most 
effectively support inclusive growth. The 
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second part of policy design in terms of 
Figure 1 is to ensure that incentives to foreign 
investors for both locating in Viet Nam and for 
subcontracting to local component suppliers 
are provided with enforceable conditions 
that ensure that the support is not captured 
by foreign investors without the desired 
investments or subcontracting taking place. 
The design of the support strategy is likely 
to be very specific to the particular projects 
being considered. The incentives that have to 
be offered and the conditions that the foreign 
investor has to credibly fulfil will depend on the 
companies and technologies involved and the 
monitoring and enforcement capabilities of the 
Vietnamese state. Thus, general incentives for 
foreign investors without the specification of 
enforceable conditions, or a general strategy 
of protecting intellectual property rights are 
unlikely to be sufficient as a policy for attracting 
high-technology investments with spillovers to 
domestic component producers. 
3. Coordination Failures
Development economists have long recognized 
that private contracting may fail to coordinate 
investments across sectors and this can constrain 
the emergence of competitive sectors if there 
are demand or supply side complementarities 
between them (Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1989; 
Nurkse, 1953; Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Scitovsky, 
1954). The efficiency attributes of market prices 
as signals of social costs and benefits can break 
down in the presence of complementarities, 
making private contracting inefficient. As a result, 
market prices may suggest that an investment 
in a particular firm or sector is unprofitable 
but in fact the investment may be profitable if 
complementary investments in other sectors 
could be simultaneously negotiated. In developing 
countries, this has been the justification for 
planning or coordinating industrialization 
strategies. This includes coordination of public 
investments in infrastructure as that can 
induce locational clustering. It also includes 
policy incentives for different sectors to induce 
clusters of related industries to set up. However, 
the governance requirements for achieving 
coordinated industrialization are quite significant 
and few developing countries have the requisite 
governance capabilities. The experience of 
development planning in the 1960s and 1970s in 
developing countries like India and Pakistan shows 
that it is not enough to produce sophisticated 
plan documents showing the interrelationships 
between sectors and the investment priorities 
for different sectors and regions. Converting 
the document into coordinated investments on 
the ground have generally proved to be much 
more difficult.
To achieve successful coordination, the relevant 
government agencies must themselves be 
coordinated and they have to be able to identify 
the sectors to coordinate on the basis of objective 
data and analysis, without being influenced by 
special interests. The agencies in charge of the 
coordinated planning must also have effective 
control over financing and implementation 
to convert the plan documents into actual 
investments, and they must have the monitoring 
capacity to ensure that resources are not wasted. 
These are demanding requirements for planning 
and coordination agencies in developing 
countries. In Viet Nam, the coordination of public 
investments has often been weak, particularly 
across provinces. It has been argued that too 
many ports, airports and industrial parks have 
been constructed, sometimes failing to achieve 
minimum efficient scale, or suffering from 
excess capacity (World Bank, 2011, pp. 53-75). 
Very often this was because of the nature of 
competition between provinces in Viet Nam that 
resulted in poor coordination of infrastructure 
investments across provinces. Competition 
between different regions of a country can 
drive efficient infrastructure investments if the 
regions or provinces are large, as in China. In 
such a context, investments in infrastructure in 
one province can induce competitive investments 
in another without producing underused 
infrastructure capacity in the first. But in Viet Nam, 
the provinces are relatively small and parallel 
investments in neighbouring provinces can result 
in underused capacity or the construction of too 
many small ports that do not achieve minimum 
efficient scale. In smaller countries, greater 
coordination of infrastructure investments is 
required across provinces and regions to ensure 
efficient investments.
Furthermore, to effectively coordinate private 
investments, the state’s planning exercise has 
to be aligned with the interests and capabilities 
of investors in the private sector. There have 
been many failed attempts to develop industrial 
clusters and industrial parks in both developed 
and developing countries. Even in Japan where 
the planning capacities of national and local 
governments are fairly advanced, the Japan 
Regional Development Corporation over-
invested in the construction of industrial parks 
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in the 1990s with a significant waste of public 
resources (Sekizawa, 2009). The risk of wasting 
resources can be reduced if governments follow 
the demand coming from private investors 
rather than attempting to direct investors to 
locate in particular sectors or regions chosen 
by government. For instance, industrial parks 
are much more likely to be successful if the 
government complements private investments, 
with private investors pre-committing their 
own funds to invest in the park at the outset 
and the government providing complementary 
resources. This was the strategy followed by the 
Indian government in the relatively successful 
programme of constructing textile parks in its 
Scheme for Integrated Textile Parks (SITP) that was 
initiated in 2005. In this scheme the government 
co-financed some of the costs of constructing 
the parks, but the design of the policy ensured 
that end-users were involved from the outset 
and had to invest their own money at the same 
time to ensure real market demand for the facility. 
This ensured that there was a higher probability 
that the right firms and locations were selected 
(Saleman & Jordan, 2013). 
Effective and successful coordination of 
infrastructure and other investments is difficult to 
achieve as they involve solving difficult problems 
of agency coordination, particularly across 
different agencies, sectors and provinces. However, 
there are also many less difficult problems of 
coordination that can be usefully addressed. For 
instance, government agencies also have to 
ensure that different policies and incentives 
are coordinated so that they do not cancel each 
other out. For instance, if a policy objective is to 
provide firms in a sector with temporary support 
using tariffs or taxes on imports, it is important to 
ensure that other agencies do not wipe out this 
support by imposing tariffs or other taxes on the 
inputs used by these firms. In our case study of the 
automobile industry in Viet Nam, we find examples 
of such policy coordination failures. This type of 
coordination is relatively easy to achieve, but may 
still involve coordination across agencies that may 
not be willing to concede on their own priorities 
and instruments. 
The first question here in terms of Figure 1 is 
therefore to identify the coordination failures 
that are limiting the development of medium 
technology sectors and that it is feasible to try and 
address given the governance and coordination 
capabilities of the state. Once an important 
but feasible set of coordination problems are 
identified, the second question is whether 
policies can be designed better to address these 
problems given the monitoring and enforcement 
requirements of successful implementation. 
The example discussed earlier about designing 
policy for investment in industrial parks that 
coordinates with private investors early on is a 
case in point. More ambitious coordination, such 
as infrastructure or industrial investment across 
provinces may be politically quite difficult to 
achieve in Viet Nam in the short to medium term, 
and this coordination failure may not even be a 
fundamental constraint on inclusive growth at 
the moment. Finally, better coordination across 
agencies setting different taxes and tariffs, or 
regulatory conditions could be important even in 
the short to medium term, and better coordination 
can arguably be achieved here. The policy 
challenge here is for higher level agencies to 
identify the different parts of a policy package 
that affects investment incentives in particular 
sectors and to coordinate the incentives 
and the conditions attached to them across 
agencies. Different agencies are likely to try 
and defend their autonomy. But if higher-level 
agencies can identify that the policy package 
offered to particular sectors by different agencies 
are contradictory, then even signalling this to the 
agencies concerned may be a useful service. 
4. Learning and Organizational  
     Capabilities 
The most important constraint on the 
development of new competitive sectors in 
developing countries is frequently the absence 
of a broad base of firms with the potential 
organizational capabilities to adopt, adapt and 
use available skills and technologies in these new 
sectors profitably. This problem is different from 
and should not be confused with the absence 
of formal skills. Firm competitiveness depends 
on the whole firm working together effectively 
as a team, and the productivity of individual 
workers depends critically on how effectively 
or otherwise the team as a whole is working 
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). The critical 
characteristic of a team is therefore that the 
productivity of individuals within the team is 
only partly determined by individual levels of 
skills, and depends to a much greater extent 
on the collective organization of the team. An 
individual’s observed productivity can be high 
or low depending on the type of team that the 
individual is in. Although this is self-evident in the 
real world, economists often ignore the problem 
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of organizational capabilities. The productivity 
of an individual worker depends to some 
extent on the skills of that worker, but to a 
large extent it depends on how well the team 
or organization is collectively working. The 
productivity of an individual worker is critically 
affected by the flow of production through the 
factory, the management of quality control, 
the management of inventories and input 
wastage and so on, most of which are firm level 
organizational questions that the individual 
worker cannot significantly affect. 
These organizational characteristics of the firm 
are embedded in the routines of the firm and 
the routines themselves are acquired through 
learning-by-doing by the team as a whole. To 
be effective, the learning-by-doing that actually 
increases team productivity also requires 
team leadership that can use opportunities for 
learning to experiment with new organizational 
designs and new systems of internal monitoring, 
supervisory and incentive structures and other 
organizational initiatives to improve collective 
productivity. Over time, firms can dramatically 
improve their productivity through these 
measures. The organizational structure that will 
achieve competitiveness is usually not simply 
a copy of the organizational structures of other 
competitive firms in the sector or in more advanced 
countries. Each firm or country begins with specific 
initial conditions in terms of the habits of the local 
workforce, local infrastructural and governance 
conditions and so on, that will together determine 
the organizational structures that will work best 
in the local context. However, if the firm can 
observe the organizational design of a local firm 
that is competitive and begin to experiment 
with that as its starting point, it is likely to have 
to do much less adaptation than if it could only 
observe the organizational design of competitive 
firms in other countries, because the adaptations 
that are required are likely to be fewer in the first 
case. This is why clustering and learning happens 
much more rapidly when some local competitive 
firms already exist, than when an entirely new 
sector is being set up, even if the technology in 
question is old and the organizational design 
of competitive firms in other countries can 
be observed. 
New firms in developing countries, particularly 
firms in new sectors, typically have low 
organizational capabilities, which simply 
means they have low capabilities of setting up 
the appropriate organizational structure for 
competitive production. As a result they have low 
competitiveness even if they can acquire the most 
appropriate machines and have workers and 
managers with the formal knowledge required 
to use this technology. This is initially true even 
for low-technology production processes such as 
garments manufacturing, and much more so for 
more sophisticated medium and high technology 
products such as components manufacturing. 
The acquisition of required organizational 
capabilities is one of the most general problems 
that affect the growth of almost all segments of 
the technology spectrum in developing countries. 
The experimentation and learning-by-doing that 
are necessary for achieving these organizational 
capabilities are subject to important contracting 
failures. An investor financing a period of 
learning is only likely to make money if the team 
puts in a high level of effort in the learning and 
experimentation process. But this is contractually 
very difficult to ensure. Without a high level 
of effort in learning, there can be a lot of doing 
without much learning, productivity will then 
fail to improve and the investor will lose money. 
Investments in these learning processes are 
therefore unlikely to happen in the absence of 
appropriate supportive policies, but if policy is 
poorly designed, learning can once again fail with 
a waste of public resources.
It is difficult to overstate the potential importance 
of overcoming this particular constraint. If a 
country lacks firms that have the know-how to 
be competitive in global markets, solving other 
problems like ensuring the supply of skilled 
labour or coordination across sectors will not 
achieve any significant results. Labour with the 
appropriate formal skills will remain unemployed 
or migrate out, and policy coordination will fail 
to elicit new investments or job creation. When 
we look at countries like China that achieved 
significant growth, a critical characteristic was the 
rapid emergence of many competitive firms using 
intermediate technologies (see Box 1). These firms 
achieved competitiveness because horizontal and 
vertical policies supporting businesses enabled 
them to engage in learning-by-doing and the 
support came with enforceable conditions that 
compelled them to raise their competitiveness 
relatively rapidly. In contrast, countries where 
policies fail to ensure the rapid emergence of 
many firms with the appropriate organizational 
capabilities are likely to fail to achieve inclusive 
growth. 
We can safely assume that there is a shortage 
of the appropriate organizational capabilities 
in developing countries and therefore that this 
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problem will have to be addressed by policy. The 
market failures facing investments in capability 
development means that in the absence of 
appropriate targeted policies, growth is unlikely 
to become broad-based or involve the emergence 
of new medium technology sectors. At a general 
level, the appropriate policy response to this 
contracting failure is for the government to 
share some of the risks and costs of financing 
the learning and development of organizational 
capabilities at the firm level. This support can be 
provided through a variety of policy instruments, 
including the temporary protection of domestic 
markets, the provision of temporary export 
subsidies and other types of explicit or implicit 
subsidies using credit policy, tax policy, land 
allocation policy or other instruments. Any of 
these types of policies potentially provide rents 
to particular firms and sectors, and can therefore 
serve as a policy for supporting the development 
of organizational capabilities in terms of the first 
question in Figure 1. 
The second step in effective policy design in terms 
of Figure 1 is much more difficult to ensure in the 
case of policies supporting the developmental of 
organizational capabilities. Why is it necessary to 
impose conditions on firms to ensure that they 
put the requisite effort into the learning process? 
The answer is to ensure that supported firms 
feel compelled to put in a high level of effort 
in the learning process. This is the problem of 
disciplining referred to in Box 2. It may appear 
that disciplining the recipients of support should 
not be necessary, because the rational strategy 
for the leadership of a firm may appear to be to 
ensure high effort in learning anyway. The prize 
for the firm would be to achieve competitiveness 
and become self-sustaining. This motivation can 
sometimes work, but the evidence suggests that 
this can by no means be taken for granted. Indeed, 
there are good reasons why this is not necessarily 
the only or even the most rational strategy for 
stakeholders in the firm. 
Support to firms to engage in learning-by-doing 
does not automatically result in productivity 
growth because learning and experimentation are 
costly exercises. Internal distributive conflicts have 
to be managed as hierarchies and responsibilities 
may have to be restructured frequently. In 
addition, the prize is not necessarily very attractive. 
The firm that puts a lot of effort into raising 
its productivity and achieves competitiveness 
through organizational learning is rewarded by 
losing its rent, as the policy support will end once 
it achieves competitiveness. Thus the successful 
firm gains the dubious privilege of sinking or 
swimming in a competitive market. Without 
some degree of compulsion to do otherwise, the 
rational behaviour of firm managers may well be to 
‘satisfice’, in the sense described by Herbert Simon 
(1956, 1983), and put more effort into ‘political’ 
rent-seeking activities to protect their rents. As a 
result, if firms get support without enforceable 
conditions imposing costs on firms that fail to 
achieve competitiveness, the likely outcome 
will be a failure to achieve competitiveness 
(Khan, 2013b, 2013c). When infant industries fail 
to become competitive despite years of support, it 
is almost always due to a failure of identifying and 
enforcing the conditions required for ensuring 
high levels of disciplined effort in developing 
organizational capabilities.
Most of the policy literature on capability 
development refers to the East Asian experience, 
particularly the Republic of Korea and Taiwan 
during the 1960s and 1970s, when the financing of 
learning-by-doing took place through significant 
ex-ante rents to firms, with enforceable conditions 
that ensured high levels of effort in raising 
competitiveness (Amsden, 1989; Lall, 1992, 2000, 
2003; Wade, 1990). Support was given to firms 
in advance (hence the rents were ex ante) and 
firms that did not perform were later disciplined 
either through the market or directly by the 
government. However, for historical reasons, 
the East Asian economies had untypical political 
settlements that allowed the enforcement of 
tough conditions on domestic public and private 
sector firms receiving this type of support (Khan, 
2009; Khan & Blankenburg, 2009). In the Republic 
of Korea, the ex ante support to large firms came in 
the form of low-interest loans, protected domestic 
markets and export subsidies but they came with 
credible sanctions if export targets were not met. 
The buoyant global markets at that time meant 
that export performance was a good indicator 
of effort in raising competitiveness. The political 
and institutional conditions in the Republic 
of Korea allowed corrective and sometimes 
punitive action to be taken against recipients of 
subsidies if export evidence suggested low effort 
in capability development. For instance, the state 
could not only withhold export subsidies if export 
growth was not achieved, it could also reallocate 
the ownership of a plant to a different chaebol 
if this was more likely to acquire the necessary 
organizational capabilities. Not surprisingly, the 
capacity to effectively enforce such conditions 
signalled to firms that they had to rapidly acquire 
competitive capabilities in order to survive, 
and the result was the rapid achievement of 
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competitiveness across a broad range of sectors. 
Other developing countries, such as India and 
Pakistan, also attempted similar types of ex ante 
industrial policy support for infant industries in 
the 1950s and 1960s, but did not have capacity 
to enforce the conditions that could ensure 
high levels of effort in learning. As a result, many 
firms and sectors supported at that time never 
became competitive (Khan, 1999, 2011, 2013a). 
Fortunately, the East Asian models of centralized 
subsidy allocation are not the only ones that 
could support the development of organizational 
capabilities. The successful development of 
competitive sectors in countries with other types 
of political and institutional structures (political 
settlements) shows that appropriately designed 
policy instruments can be effective, provided the 
conditions required for the success of the policy 
are compatible with the enforcement capabilities 
of the state (Khan, 2013b). The critical requirement 
is that these conditions create credible incentives 
and compulsions for high effort in developing 
organizational capabilities. This is borne out by 
examples of successful technology adoption in 
some economic sectors in Bangladesh, India and 
Thailand in the 1980s (Khan, 2009, 2011, 2012a, 
2012b). 
Box 4    The Indian Automobile Industry: Developing Capabilities with  
 ‘ex post’ Rents
India’s attempts to develop an automobile industry failed to produce a globally competitive 
auto industry until the 1980s. The support provided to domestic firms through market 
protection and other subsidies could not enforce conditions that ensured the achievement 
of global competitiveness. Political and institutional structures prevented the effective 
disciplining of firms receiving significant ex ante rents. In the 1970s India still produced 
only around 40,000 low quality cars for its domestic market. Dramatic changes came about 
through an accident of history in the 1980s. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s younger son, 
Sanjay Gandhi, attempted to set up a modern automobile plant, but died in 1980 before 
this could take off. The Indian government took the plant under public ownership and 
looked around for a multinational partner to make the project work. As the Gandhi family’s 
reputation was at stake, the government was keen to find a pragmatic policy solution that 
would produce a high quality car. The result was a joint venture between Maruti (the Indian 
public sector plant) and Suzuki (a Japanese multinational) that marked the beginning of a 
significant change in the design of policy for the automobile sector in India. The new policy 
design created opportunities and compulsions for capability development that were to have 
far-reaching effects on the Indian automobile industry. The results were dramatic. By 2015 
India was producing more than 3 million passenger cars of global quality and competitiveness. 
India also became one of the few countries in the world that could competitively produce 
its own branded cars, like the Tata and the Mahindra, based on the emergence of a globally 
competitive Indian-owned components industry. What explains this dramatic turnaround?
The policy design that emerged with the Maruti-Suzuki partnership indirectly provided resources 
for financing the development of capabilities of domestic components manufacturers. But 
the policy design reduced the requirement of state enforcement of conditions for achieving 
successful outcomes to levels that were feasible within the Indian political settlement. This was 
achieved because the support was no longer provided ex ante but was rather an ex post prize 
to the foreign technology provider, conditional on the multinational raising the organizational 
capabilities of domestic component producers. Suzuki was offered the prize of being able to 
sell the new cars in the protected Indian market that enjoyed at that time a tariff protection 
of more than 85 percent (this was the ex post rent that Suzuki could collect), but only if it 
achieved 60 percent domestic content within five years. Thus, the only condition that the state 
had to enforce to achieve desirable results was that Suzuki would only be allowed to collect 
the ex post rent in the domestic market if the domestic procurement condition was met.
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This was a credible condition given the political and bureaucratic capacities of the contemporary 
Indian state. This policy design created strong incentives for Suzuki to first invest its own time 
and resources to work with Indian component producers to raise their quality and productivity 
to levels that would be appropriate for inclusion in an essentially Japanese car meeting global 
competitive standards. The ex post prize was large enough, and the initial capabilities of Indian 
component producers were high enough, for this to be a profitable enterprise for Suzuki 
(Becker-Ritterspach, 2007; Khan, 2013c). 
The results were dramatic. Maruti-Suzuki managed to capture 50 percent of the lucrative 
domestic market in a couple of years. Through the 1990s, the Indian government repeated this 
deal with a string of foreign auto companies, inviting them to get a share of the ex post rents 
in the Indian market provided they met specific domestic content targets. By the late 1990s 
the improvement in organizational and technical capabilities of Indian tier one component 
producers was great enough for them to start winning prestigious international quality 
prizes like the Deming Prize. Indian automobile companies like Mahindra entered the game 
as the presence of a range of Indian-owned components industries allowed Indian branded 
cars to be produced. The Indian automobile story is thus an excellent example of the 
potentially virtuous links that can be set up between foreign technology brought in by 
a multinational and government policies encouraging the development of domestic 
component producers. By 2012, the Indian auto industry accounted for around 7 percent 
of Indian employment and GDP. This huge contribution to inclusive growth would not have 
happened if a globally competitive domestic component industry had not emerged and if 
the Suzuki investment had been limited to assembling cars using imported components 
(Khan, 2013c). Moreover, this was relatively high-wage employment so the automobile sector 
not only created significant new employment opportunities, but also at higher than average 
wages. Finally, while growth in the Indian automobile sector faced many constraints, the 
critical turnaround clearly came with targeted policy instruments that created incentives for 
financing capability development in Indian component producers. 
The specific policy instruments used in India at that time are not necessarily replicable in other 
countries (or even in India today), as tariffs and domestic content requirements are disallowed 
by WTO and other trade agreements. What is relevant is to understand the significance of 
policy design that can dramatically change outcomes by structuring incentives differently. 
The challenge in countries like Viet Nam is to devise policy support that creates incentives 
for foreign technology providers to invest in the development of domestic capabilities 
at appropriate levels of the supply chain that domestic producers could feasibly fill within 
relatively short periods of time.  
Policy design matters because different policies 
allocate support based on different conditions, 
to different types of firms and the support can be 
delivered at different points in the development 
of competitive capabilities. The conditions that 
need to be monitored and enforced can differ 
depending on the design of the policy. Some 
states are able to enforce some conditions and 
not others, so it is critical to design policy keeping 
in mind both the nature of the problem that 
needs to be solved and the range of conditions 
that can or cannot be enforced by a particular 
state. The East Asian type of policy provided ex 
ante support to large companies, that is, support 
before the company achieved competitiveness. 
The point of the support was to enable the 
company to engage in learning by commencing 
production operations even though it was not yet 
competitive. With this type of policy, companies 
have to be prevented from following a relaxed 
approach to enhancing competitiveness, and 
these states were successful because they had 
the capability to monitor performance and to 
withdraw support or even change the ownership 
and management of plant if performance was 
below target. Unfortunately, large companies in 
most developing countries have the capability 
of developing political and bureaucratic links 
with the state apparatus that make the effective 
imposition of these types of conditions quite 
unlikely. As a result, in the typical developing 
country, policies where all or most of the support 
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is largely provided ex ante are likely to achieve 
limited results in developing new competitive 
sectors.
Successes in capability development in countries 
where it was difficult to discipline large domestic 
companies had a very different policy design, 
and rents were allocated on very different terms 
and conditions. In one variant, which played 
an important role in the development of the 
Indian automobile industry (see Box 4) and the 
Bangladeshi garment industry, the policy rent 
was provided ex post to firms investing in the 
development of domestic organizational and 
technical capabilities. The rent was typically a 
prize to a foreign technology firm, whose job 
was to transfer not just the technology, but 
more importantly, the relevant organizational 
capabilities to one or more domestic firms. 
The ex post prize was large enough to induce 
the foreign firm to invest its own resources in 
developing the organizational capabilities of 
domestic firms sufficiently for it to claim the prize. 
The achievement of competitiveness on the part 
of the domestic firms was easy to observe in this 
policy design because the foreign firm was either 
buying components from the domestic firms 
whose competitiveness it had to improve (the 
Indian automobile case) or the foreign firm was 
selling inputs such as fabrics to domestic firms 
who would only be able to export if they were 
competitive (the Bangladeshi garments case). 
Policy design can thus significantly reduce 
the monitoring and enforcement that states 
have to do to achieve successful outcomes. 
Moreover, since the foreign firms involved were 
first investing their own resources to raise the 
competitiveness of the local partners, they had 
strong compulsions to put in a high level of 
effort in working with local partners to help them 
achieve competitiveness. Finally, since the local 
partners (like the components producers in the 
auto industry example in Box 4) did not directly 
get any rents from the state, they could not use 
rent seeking to protect ex ante rents. If they failed 
to cooperate with the foreign company working 
with them to raise their competitiveness, they 
would have no prospect of enhancing sales 
and profits. The policy design thus aligned the 
incentives of the different partners to achieve 
competitiveness to a much greater extent than a 
strategy of ex ante rents to local companies, and 
this reduced the monitoring and enforcement 
requirements on the part of the state. Some 
monitoring and enforcement capabilities were 
still required, for instance to check if the conditions 
for accessing the ex post prize had been achieved, 
but these requirements were much more in line 
with the actual capabilities of these states. Not 
surprisingly, success was dramatic, and new 
sectors with competitive capabilities actually 
emerged (Khan, 2013b). These examples show 
that the second part of the policy design process 
outlined in Figure 1 is crucially important to 
address if this market failure is to be successfully 
overcome. 
In the new post-WTO policy context, what types 
of policy design could create similar incentives 
for foreign technology providers to assist in 
the development of component industries that 
could service their requirements? Clearly, the 
foreign multinational is unlikely to engage in 
these investments and put in the effort without a 
substantial return that would justify its costs. This 
return has to be in the form of a performance-
related prize that has to be calibrated in terms of its 
magnitude and the conditions attached to meet 
specific requirements of capability development 
in particular sectors. These details would have to 
be worked out through detailed negotiations and 
the final policy instrument would have to satisfy 
the conditions of incentive compatibility and the 
enforcement capabilities of the state.
A viable strategy of developing competitive 
local firms using ex post incentives for foreign 
companies clearly has to be closely coordinated 
with strategies for attracting foreign technology. 
The joint policy package therefore requires 
attention to agency coordination and making 
sure that different policies, in particular those 
for attracting foreign technology and those 
supporting the development of domestic 
competitive sectors do not work at cross purposes 
or cancel each other out. Thus, the strategy for 
attracting FDI should target firms and sectors 
where components could potentially be supplied 
by domestic firms if their capabilities were 
appropriately enhanced. In the Indian auto case 
described in Box 4, it was lucky for India that the 
component industry was sufficiently developed 
in terms of its initial levels of capabilities. This 
made it feasible for Suzuki to accept the challenge 
of developing the components industry as a 
viable business proposition. If an integrated 
policy package has to be designed, the initial 
conditions of different domestic component 
sectors need to be studied, and foreign 
investment sought in areas where, with 
appropriate capability development, domestic 
component producers are most likely to be able 
to enter. 
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The next step is to coordinate the policy for 
attracting foreign investment with policies that 
create credible incentives with enforceable 
conditions for the foreign investor to directly invest 
and assist in the development of competitive 
domestic firms that can act as suppliers or 
purchasers of inputs. Clearly, the foreign 
technology provider is unlikely to make these 
investments in developing domestic capabilities 
without significant incentives, but the incentives 
have to be provided in such a way that the rents 
cannot be captured without the development of 
the local capabilities. The examples of successful 
capability development referred to earlier provide 
some guidelines about what is involved, though 
the details of the policy would be different in 
Viet Nam and would have to be compliant with 
the specific trade and intellectual property right 
treaties Viet Nam has signed.
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A number of characteristics of Vietnamese 
political economy are particularly important 
for understanding the challenges for designing 
policies. Viet Nam has had many policies 
supporting the development of new sectors but 
it has not been very effective in enforcing the 
necessary conditions for ensuring that the policy 
support led to the emergence of new competitive 
sectors. Viet Nam has had a number of such 
policies, including preferential land allocation, 
tariffs, tax breaks and preferential access to 
credit. However, as in many developing countries, 
these types of support were provided ex ante to 
domestic companies in the expectation that they 
would eventually become competitive. However 
this type of ex ante support requires strong 
enforcement of conditions on the firms receiving 
the rents and the Vietnamese state clearly did not 
perform very well in this enforcement. 
The limited capacity of the Vietnamese state 
to impose conditions on local firms receiving 
support may appear to be paradoxical in a one-
party state. We may have expected such a state 
to have the power to impose conditions on firms 
receiving support. But several characteristics of 
the Vietnamese state have prevented this in reality. 
First, many of the firms receiving support are 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that are linked 
to the party and state. These firms could protect 
their rents and resist disciplining using their 
internal contacts and connections with the state 
and with the party. Secondly, power is relatively 
broadly dispersed within the Vietnamese 
Communist Party, across different levels of the 
party hierarchy and across regions. As a result, 
it has not been easy for the central authorities to 
impose conditions on rent recipients who may 
have contacts and connections with lower levels 
of the party and state, or with provincial party and 
state authorities. These features of the Vietnamese 
political economy can help to explain some of 
the limits of the rent management capabilities 
of different parts of the state. These features of 
Vietnamese political economy need to be kept 
in mind in devising policy in the future. They can 
help to explain why Viet Nam’s experience with 
policy instruments that provided large ex ante 
rents to firms, mainly SOEs, delivered relatively 
poor results in terms of developing new segments 
of competitive domestic industries. Thus, while 
Viet Nam’s political settlement is clearly different 
from India or Bangladesh, Viet Nam has also 
found it difficult to discipline large firms receiving 
significant ex ante rents. 
Despite the rapid growth of the private sector 
in recent years, SOEs remain important players 
in many sectors of the economy in terms of 
firm size and capitalization. SOEs still find it 
easier to access investment resources in many 
sectors and therefore use more capital-intensive 
technologies. Potentially SOEs have access to 
significant rents in the form of privileged access 
to credit and land and these could have been 
used to create opportunities for learning and 
capability development if continued access to 
these rents could have been made conditional on 
improvements in competitiveness. Unfortunately, 
SOE links with the party and state prevented 
this from happening. The continued ability of 
many inefficient SOEs to claim subsidies without 
improving competitiveness has been identified 
as a serious problem for sustaining growth in Viet 
Nam (Perkins & Vu-Thanh, 2011). However, not all 
SOEs are inefficient, and some SOEs have driven 
productivity growth with spillovers for the rest of 
the economy. In these cases, SOEs had internal 
rent management capabilities and leadership that 
enabled them to use their access to rents to engage 
in effective learning and capability development. 
In our case studies we find evidence of this in a 
few SOEs in the garments and textiles sector and 
Ngo outlines how an SOE drove innovation and 
productivity growth in the telecommunications 
sector (Ngo, 2013). Though SOEs are not a focus 
of this paper, clearly under some circumstances 
SOEs can use and manage their rents to achieve 
significant capability development. 
IV. Viet Nam’s Institutional and    
     Political Context 
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We have seen that competition between provinces 
could have resulted in poor coordination of 
infrastructure investments in ports and industrial 
parks with excess capacity in some cases and 
the failure to achieve minimum efficient scale 
in others. A more serious consequence is that 
competition between provinces to attract 
investments, and particularly FDI, could result in 
a race to the bottom in terms of offers of rents 
to foreign investors without any enforceable 
conditions being attached to those rents. If 
each province tries to attract FDI by cutting tax 
requirements, offering cheaper land or promising 
specific infrastructure with fewer enforceable 
conditions, the result may be to enhance the 
bargaining power of foreign investors as they 
can go from province to province trying to get 
better deals. The effect of such a strategy may 
be that total FDI to Viet Nam may not much 
increase, but the conditions that the FDI investors 
are able to achieve may get progressively more 
attractive to them and reduce the policy space of 
the Vietnamese government to offer incentives 
that are conditional on the achievement of 
socially desirable outcomes. In particular, foreign 
investors may end up paying less and less tax and 
it may become even more difficult to persuade 
them to invest in building the competitiveness 
of local suppliers. Yet the access to tax revenues 
and the implementation of policies that develop 
a broad range of domestic component producing 
industries are important components of an 
inclusive growth strategy.
Finally, the rent management context in Viet 
Nam has been rapidly changing as a result of 
the integration of the Vietnamese economy into 
global trade and investment regimes through 
free-trade agreements like the WTO and bilateral 
free trade and investment agreements. These 
agreements have reduced the scope of tariffs 
and the possibility of negotiating domestic 
content requirements with foreign investors. 
Tariffs have been important instruments through 
which temporary support was provided to 
domestic industries, even though their efficacy 
in developing competitive sectors depended 
largely on the conditions that could be imposed 
on supported domestic industries. However, if 
the instrument itself is no longer readily available, 
conditions have to be attached to other forms of 
support. Domestic content requirements were 
also used by countries as a condition attached to 
the support offered to foreign investors. Domestic 
content was an easy way to measure the transfer 
of technological and organizational capabilities 
to domestic firms. If domestic content cannot 
be directly invoked as a condition for policy 
support to foreign investors, other measures of 
local capability development have to be used. 
The disappearance of some of these policy 
instruments and conditions makes the design 
of policy more difficult but the importance 
of supporting capability development with 
appropriate policies remains. 
Table 1 shows the significant changes in ownership 
structure in the industrial sector in Viet Nam 
over the last two decades. The share of foreign 
enterprises has grown from a negligible share in 
industrial output in the 1980s to almost half and its 
share in industrial investments has risen to almost 
a quarter by 2011-13. The significant weight of 
foreign enterprises underlines the importance 
of devising strategies in Viet Nam that can link 
FDI to domestic capability development. On the 
other hand, the share of SOEs in industrial output 
has fallen from more than half in the 1980s to 17 
percent, but their share in investment remains 
close to 40 percent suggesting high levels of capital 
intensity and perhaps wasteful investments in this 
sector. Interestingly, the share of the Vietnamese 
non-state (private) sector has also declined since 
the 1980s, and this reflects the small scale and 
limited capabilities of the Vietnamese private 
sector. The approach identified in this paper 
is to link the development of the Vietnamese 
non-state sector to FDI in new and creative 
ways to ensure inclusive growth is accelerated 
and sustained. Productivity growth in both 
agriculture and manufacturing has also slowed 
down since 2001. Between 2001-05 and 2006-
09, agricultural productivity growth declined 
from 4.5 percent per annum to 2.8 percent, and 
manufacturing productivity growth from 2.5 to 1.0 
percent (Perkins & Vu-Thanh, 2011, p. Figure 7). It 
is in this context that the challenges of sustaining 
inclusive growth in Viet Nam have to be seen.
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Table 1   Changes in Ownership Structure of the Vietnamese Industrial Sector
1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 2001-05 2006-10 2011-13
Share in Industrial Output (%)
  State Enterprises 55.4 55.0 43.3 28.9 19.5 16.9
  Non-State Enterprises 43.1 28.3 23.1 28.4 36.7 35.8
  Foreign Enterprises 1.4 16.7 33.6 42.8 43.8 47.3
Share in Industrial Investment (%)
  State Enterprises 51.9 39.5 54.4 53.0 39.1 39.2
  Non-State Enterprises 42.5 36.3 23.6 30.9 36.3 38.1
  Foreign Enterprises 5.6 24.2 22.0 16.0 24.6 22.7
Source: (Vu-Thanh, 2014)
On the positive side, the new trade architecture 
has encouraged new types of FDI to come to 
Viet Nam, particularly in the assembly of higher 
technology electronics, which has become a new 
growth sector. Free-trade agreements attracted 
some of these investments as they made it easier 
for multinational investors in Viet Nam to import 
the components required for assembly operations. 
On the negative side, an immediate impact of the 
new framework has been to make it somewhat 
more complex for the state to develop policies 
to support the growth of domestic component 
supplying industries. The provincial competition 
for FDI may also have intensified, making it easier 
for multinationals to get more attractive support 
packages from national and local governments, 
with fewer conditions attached. 
The market failures that constrain the 
development of competitiveness continue 
to operate, so support for new clusters and 
supporting industries still has to be provided, but 
in different ways. In addition to the requirement 
of designing enforceable conditions for ensuring 
the achievement of competitiveness, policies 
now have to be compliant with new trade 
and investment treaties. The paper draws on 
three sectoral case studies on the electronics, 
automotive, and garments and textiles sectors 
in Viet Nam to outline some of the core policy 
challenges for supporting inclusive growth. 
Supporting Inclusive Growth - Effective Policy Design for Developing  Medium Technology Sectors30
1. Garments and Textiles 
The garments and textiles industry is the second 
biggest export industry in Viet Nam. It has 
enjoyed double digit growth rates in most years 
since the growth take-off in the late 1980s. Even 
after the global slowdown in 2008-09, growth 
recovered rapidly. The garments industry is 
not very capital intensive and entry for new 
entrepreneurs is relatively easy since capital 
requirements are not very great. However, Viet 
Nam has faced problems in moving up the value 
chain and now faces more intense competition in 
the lower value segments of the market as lower 
wage countries like Bangladesh and Cambodia 
have entered these segments. The slow growth 
in the competitiveness of the textile sector has 
meant that the growth of the garments industry 
has been largely dependent on imported fabrics, 
and local content has varied between 20 and 29 
percent between 2000 and 2012 (Table 3).
Table 2   Viet Nam: Garments and Textiles Revenues (millions of US Dollars)
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total Revenue 1,962 2,752 3,654 4,368 4,838 5,927 7,780 9,130 9,084 11,210 15,830 17,200
Growth Rate (%) 3.60 40 33 20 11 23 31 17 -0.5 23 41 8.6
Source: (Ngo, 2013, p. Table 5.1).
Table 3   Local Content Ratio in Garments and Textiles (millions of US Dollars)
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Export Revenue 4,838 5,927 7,780 9,130 9,084 11,210 15,830 15,090
Imports of Raw Materials 4,365 4,992 6,356 7,064 6,422 8,912 12,000 11,000
Import of Fabric 2,399 2,980 3,980 4,454 4,226 5,378 6,750 7,045
Local Content Ratio 0.10 0.16 0.18 0.23 0.29 0.20 0.24 0.27
Source: (Ngo, 2013, p. Table 5.5)
In 2013, there were 5,982 textile and apparel 
companies according to the Viet Nam Textile and 
Apparel Association. In terms of numbers the 
vast majority, around 84 percent, were private 
companies. However, the private companies are 
typically very small compared both to the massive 
state owned companies, many of which are in 
the process of equitization as well as the rapidly 
growing number of foreign-owned companies. 
Foreign owned companies constituted only 15 
percent of the total number of firms, but accounted 
for 60 percent of the export turnover in 2012-13 
(Viet Nam Textile and Apparel Association, 2013). 
The garments and textiles sector employs around 
2.5 million people, which is roughly 10 percent 
of Viet Nam’s industrial workforce (Hubbard, 
2013). Every additional one billion dollars of 
exports creates an extra 150 to 200 thousand 
jobs, at an average income that is between fifty 
to one hundred percent greater than Viet Nam’s 
per capita income (Viet Nam Textile and Apparel 
Association, 2013), a huge potential for creating 
productive employment opportunities. Figure 2 
shows that historically value added per employee 
V. Case Studies
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in both the textiles and garments sectors in Viet 
Nam has been significantly lower than regional 
competitor countries (but note the figures for 
the garments sector include footwear) indicating 
the scope for making progress in upgrading 
technologies and organizational capabilities to 
move into higher valued ranges of both textiles 
and garments. Figure 2 also shows that Viet Nam 
has been able to narrow the gap in terms of value 
added per employee in textiles in recent years 
compared to some comparator countries whereas 
in leather and apparel there is little progress.
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The take-off in the garments sector began after 
the US granted Viet Nam Normal Trade Relations 
in 2001. Under the Multi-fibre Arrangement 
(MFA) Viet Nam had quota-free access until 2003. 
The MFA period provided the garments industry 
in Viet Nam with quota rents, as the allocation 
of quotas to Vietnamese companies gave the 
privileged companies rents. This period saw the 
rapid development of competitive capabilities in 
Viet Nam as the quota rents available under the 
MFA allowed learning-by-doing to develop the 
requisite organizational capabilities. However, 
the development of organizational capabilities 
could have been much faster and more broad-
based if the allocation of the quotas could have 
been effectively linked to the achievement 
of competitiveness. In theory the Vietnamese 
government did have a system of quota allocation 
jointly managed by the Ministry of Industries and 
Ministry of Commerce based on criteria linked to 
competitiveness. However, Ngo shows that these 
conditions could not be effectively imposed and 
firms with connections could use rent seeking to 
get allocations of quotas independently of their 
relative performance in achieving competitiveness 
(Ngo, 2013, pp. 221-300). This is an early example 
of a policy design that failed to achieve optimal 
results because the conditions of allocating rents 
to firms were not fully enforceable.
The garments and textiles sector demonstrates 
the complexity of raising productivity in 
production systems that are integrated into 
global value chains. As Figure 3 shows, the actual 
production part of the garments and textiles 
chain is a relatively low value adding process, 
relative to the value added in pre-production 
and post-production activities. A developing 
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country seeking to raise the value added in 
its garments and textiles sector can attempt 
to do so either by moving into higher valued 
segments of the global value chain (horizontal 
movements to the left or right in Figure 3), or it 
can raise the productivity and value added in 
production (a vertical movement in Figure 3), 
or both. Movements in any of these directions 
involve the development of new or improved 
organizations and organizational capabilities, 
and therefore involve investments in learning-by-
doing as well as investments in new technologies. 
In general, significant horizontal movements 
involve developing organizations with a global 
reach that can engage in global processes of 
fashion design, research and development or 
marketing. The organizational structures and 
capital required to engage in these activities is 
usually beyond the reach of developing countries 
till they are much more advanced, and by then 
they are likely to move out of significant direct 
production activities in garments and textiles as 
a result of rising wages. For developing countries, 
the more likely mechanism for raising value added 
in garments and textiles is some movement 
towards purchasing and distribution, but more 
significantly, improvements in the productivity 
and value added in production activities through 
vertical movements of the production segment. 

























Source: Developed from Fernandez-Stark, Frederick, & Gereffi (2011)
The improvements in production processes 
(vertical moves in 3) that can lead to higher 
value added in production involve moving into 
the production of more sophisticated garments, 
the production of higher value fabrics, the use 
of better accessories, achieving higher quality of 
dyeing, finishing and packaging and so on. Each 
of these steps involves not only investments in 
new machines and more skilled workforces, but 
also investments in developing organizational 
capabilities through learning-by-doing so as to 
manage more complex production processes, 
more exacting quality control, managing more 
expensive stocks through better inventory 
management and so on. Instead of reinventing 
the wheel, the typical strategies through which 
developing countries achieve these goals is by 
imitating the organizational strategies of more 
advanced countries and adapting them to local 
circumstances and conditions. This involves, at 
each stage, investments in learning-by-doing to 
develop the required organizational capabilities. 
This is where different types of rent management 
strategies become relevant. 
The initial development of the garments and 
textile sector in Viet Nam was driven by SOEs. 
The SOEs had access to rents in a number of 
forms that allowed them to engage in production 
before they had fully achieved competitiveness, 
and this was critical for enabling the learning-
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by-doing that eventually allowed many of them 
to achieve competitiveness. An important source 
of rents was the allocation of land to SOEs, 
which could be used as collateral for obtaining 
bank credit from state banks at lower interest 
rates than would be warranted by their market 
competitiveness. Secondly, in the later 1990s and 
early 2000s, the state also linked SOEs to foreign 
investors as the latter required local partners in 
joint ventures at that time. In theory this provided 
SOEs with privileged access to technology and 
organizational learning. Finally, the government 
also allocated funds to support training and skills 
development in the industry. This was partly to 
develop competitiveness in general, but partly 
also to spread growth to poor and mountainous 
regions of the country. One of the industry 
associations with significant SOE representation, 
VITAS (Viet Nam Textile and Apparel Association) 
and the large public sector holding company, 
VINATEX (Viet Nam National Textile and Garment 
Group) were given the responsibility to carry out 
the training to achieve these objectives. 
While the significance of the other rents has 
gradually declined over time, the investment 
in skills through the SOE sector has remained 
important. In 2008 the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade and in 2010 the Ministry of Finance 
promulgated support policies for different types 
of training in the garments industry, including 
overseas training and joint training programmes 
with foreign enterprises, with foreign enterprises 
getting a minimum of 30 percent of their training 
costs as policy support. Vinatex was designated 
coordinator of these training programmes. In a 
limited survey carried out in 2014 on the efficacy 
of these support programmes, researchers found 
very limited impact of these policies according 
to garments industry insiders (Phi, Tran, & Trinh, 
2014). The vocational training programmes were 
only accessible to plants belonging to Vinatex 
and private sector firms appeared not to know 
about the programme. Not only were the support 
programmes inadequately publicized, access was 
institutionally limited to a small number of plants 
which were not necessarily the ones facing the 
most severe skills shortages. Moreover, it was not 
clear how effectively the training outcomes were 
being monitored and what penalties there were 
for wasting resources. It would not be surprising if 
this policy design resulted in limited achievements 
in raising competitiveness or developing new 
employment or new firms. 
These policies implicitly allocated rents to different 
stakeholders and in theory they could have 
supported both the development of organizational 
capabilities and also the development of new 
skills. However, support for skills development 
can be wasteful without effective monitoring 
and enforcement of conditions attached to the 
funds received by training providers. In particular, 
skills development in remote areas should be 
complemented with support policies to enhance 
the organizational capabilities of local firms if 
sustainable employment is to be generated. 
Finally, we found that private sector firms often 
could not access these rents, and in addition, they 
reported difficulties in borrowing from banks to 
expand their businesses because they did not 
have the land allocations to use as collateral that 
SOEs have historically enjoyed. 
More recent growth in the sector has been 
driven by foreign companies. Some of them are 
operating in higher value-added segments of 
the garments industry but so far spillovers of 
technical and organizational capabilities to local 
firms have been very slow. Rapid export growth 
in the garments sector is continuing as a result of 
foreign companies locating in Viet Nam, but the 
import of fabrics and accessories is also rapidly 
growing, so that the growth of net value added 
in the sector is relatively slow. Government 
policies have been particularly weak in terms of 
developing a competitive textile industry and 
other supporting accessory industries. As textile 
plants are large investments, this is an area where 
SOEs have played a significant role in the past. 
However, as a result of the rent management 
problems discussed earlier, their competitiveness 
remained low and the bulk of fabrics continue 
to be imported. There is a major investment in 
polyester fabrics (the Dinh Vu Polyester project) 
that is ongoing. This is a partnership between 
PVTex (a subsidiary of Vinatex) and PetroVietnam. 
This investment undoubtedly benefits from the 
support and the rents that are available to SOEs. 
The question is whether this fabric plant will 
achieve competitiveness, which depends on 
the internal compulsions on the managers, the 
external pressures on them, and the credibility 
and enforceability of any conditions attached to 
their continued access to rents. These conditions 
are not transparent but the poor competitiveness 
of previous investments in textiles suggests that 
without effective conditions being imposed, the 
likelihood of poor outcomes remains significant. 
The WTO and other free trade agreements 
have also resulted in a gradual reduction and 
removal of explicit subsidies to the sector. Finally, 
preparations for TPP are ongoing, and this may 
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make policies for supporting organizational 
learning in the textile sector more complex 
in the future if and when the TPP is actually 
implemented. At the same time, TPP can make 
foreign investments in Viet Nam attractive and 
this could drive growth in higher end segments 
of the garments industry. The policy challenges 
in the sector include the following. The large 
number of smaller domestic private companies in 
the garments sector are effectively discriminated 
against because they cannot access land, credit 
and other resources on the same terms as the SOEs 
or the bigger foreign investors. However, inclusive 
growth in the form of broad-based employment 
generation and entrepreneurial opportunities is 
likely to be enhanced if domestic private firms 
in the sector can be supported to enhance their 
competitiveness and quality. 
The development of productivity and value 
added in production in the local firms is most 
likely to be successful if partnerships between 
higher value adding foreign garments producers 
and local private companies can be achieved by 
policies creating incentives for these partnerships, 
but with effective and enforceable conditions 
for the transfer of know-how to local partners. 
These partnerships are most likely to be effective 
when a more advanced country is moving up the 
value chain shown in Figure 3, into say design 
and marketing and out of particular segments 
of production. With sufficient incentives such 
companies may be persuaded to transfer know-
how about the production segments they are 
moving out of to developing country partners. 
The more advanced country companies may have 
an incentive to do this beyond the incentives 
offered by the Vietnamese government if the 
production of the future Vietnamese partners 
is to be designed or distributed by the foreign 
partner. This has been the typical strategy 
for countries enhancing their value added in 
production (Fernandez-Stark et al., 2011; Gereffi & 
Memedovic, 2003; Keane & Te Velde, 2008). 
A second major challenge for the garments 
and textile sector is that the policy support for 
developing a domestic textile and accessory 
sector has not yet delivered significant successes. 
Here policy design in the past was not compatible 
with the state’s rent management capabilities, 
and support for large domestic textile producing 
SOEs did not come with credible conditions that 
could compel rapid growth in competitiveness. 
The challenge here is to redesign policy so that it 
supports the requisite investments in capability 
development, but with effective conditions that 
ensure high levels of effort by the recipients to 
achieve competitiveness rapidly. International 
experience as well as the experience of Viet Nam 
suggests that this too is more likely to happen 
through partnerships between foreign companies 
and domestic private sector companies. 
2. Automobile Industry 
Since 1992 the automobile industry was 
considered a priority sector and received one 
of the largest packages of incentives from the 
government. The sector grew at almost 17.5 
percent per annum over the period 2000-2010, 
but despite this the sector remains largely an 
assembly operation with almost no development 
of domestically owned components industries. By 
2013 there were 56 firms in the sector, of which 
18 were foreign owned, but together the total 
production capacity was only around 460,000 
vehicles per year, which could be the output of 
a single large globally competitive automobile 
plant. In addition there were around 210 firms 
engaged in making automobile components but 
these firms were typically very small and engaged 
in simple low-value component production like 
mirrors, glass, seats, batteries, parts of the chassis, 
tyres, radiators, wires and springs and steering 
wheels. Important components like engines, 
gearboxes and so on were entirely imported. 
The domestic content (or localization) was 
only around seven percent in 2014. In contrast, 
Thailand has over 1,500 components supplying 
firms and achieves a 70-80 percent localization 
rate. As the Vietnamese automobile sector 
includes many smaller and low technology plants, 
total employment was high, around 80,000 in 
2013 (Pham, Dao, & Vu, 2014). 
Policy support to the sector has included tariff 
protection, preferential excise taxes for local 
producers, domestic content requirements, 
privileged access to land and credit, and tax 
exemptions. Tariff rates have been very high for 
automobiles, ranging from 70-90 percent for cars 
of different engine capacities in 2014, but under 
WTO rules they are set to reduce to between 47-
70 percent by 2019. Even more significantly, under 
the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) 
and the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), 
tariffs within ASEAN are set to reduce to 0 percent 
by 2018.  Although tariffs on imported cars have 
been high, the tariffs on components have been 
much lower, around 24 percent of value, which 
inadvertently created incentives for assembly 
operations rather than the development of local 
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component industries. We will return to these 
coordination failures later. In addition to tariffs, 
preferential excise taxes were used between 
1995 and 2006 to give an incentive to domestic 
producers. Selected foreign firms also received 
tax exemptions and rent-free land for a number of 
years. For instance, Toyo Denso Viet Nam received 
three years of 100 percent tax exemption on their 
taxable income, and 50 percent tax exemption for 
another seven years (Pham et al., 2014).
Despite the significant levels of policy support 
to the sector, policy was relatively ineffective in 
developing a competitive Vietnamese automobile 
industry or competitive components suppliers on 
any significant scale. Figure 4 shows that by 2006 
the productivity of the Vietnamese automobile 
industry was significantly lower compared to its 
regional competitors in Thailand and Malaysia 
and China. The gap narrowed during 2008-2009 
compared to Viet Nam and Malaysia but since then 
value added per employee in Viet Nam declined 
again increasing the gap with other countries. 
In 2012, Viet Nam automobile’s  value added 
was just half of Malaysia’s. As Viet Nam failed to 
raise competitiveness, Japanese investments in 
the region were directed mainly to Thailand and 
then later to Indonesia, which have emerged as 
the preferred Japanese locations for automobile 
production in the region. This poses significant 
challenges for Viet Nam in determining a viable 
strategy for its automobile sector in the ASEAN 
region.
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By 2013, Viet Nam had attracted a total FDI in 
the automobile sector of just over one billion 
US dollars, equal to the FDI in a single large 
automobile factory in Thailand or Indonesia. 
Despite very high levels of tariff protection, 
foreign investors benefiting from these policy 
rents clearly did not invest very much and failed 
to deliver on the domestic content outcomes they 
had agreed to achieve. The official plan was to 
achieve a localization rate of 40 percent by 2005 
and 60 percent by 2010 for trucks, buses and cars. 
But by 2014 the localization was only around 7-10 
percent for private cars (Ford 2 percent, Suzuki 3 
percent, Toyota 7 percent) and 35-40 percent for 
light trucks and buses (Thaco around 33 percent, 
Vinaxuki around 50 percent). Toyota, for instance, 
committed to achieve a localization rate of 30 
percent by 2006 but achieved only seven percent 
in 2014. No penalties were imposed on the 
recipients of support. Other possible targets, like 
export targets, were not even identified. 
The failure to enforce conditions on ex ante rents 
is a significant problem in most developing 
countries because strong political and institutional 
enforcement capabilities are required to enforce 
these conditions. However, in Viet Nam, some of 
the biggest beneficiaries of the policy support 
were foreign firms and as these firms are typically 
not closely connected to bureaucratic or political 
power centres, it should have been easier to 
enforce some of these conditions. We can compare 
the Vietnamese experience with that of the Indian 
automobile sector upgrading described in Box 4. 
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One difference with the Indian case was that Viet 
Nam did not already have substantial capabilities 
in its tier one and two components sectors, and its 
domestic market was much smaller, so the level of 
rents provided to foreign investors through tariff 
protection of the domestic market may have been 
insufficient to induce the degree of investment 
in capability development that may have been 
required. If this was the case, the calibration of 
rents and domestic content targets would need 
to be different to be feasible and enforceable.
A further possibility is coordination failure across 
the relevant government agencies that could 
explain poor enforcement of conditions. The 
monitoring of progress in localization was the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade, the provision of financial incentives was 
the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance, 
while the withdrawal of business licenses was 
the responsibility of the Ministry of Planning 
and Investment (Pham et al., 2014). Effective 
monitoring and enforcement of conditions could 
only happen in this scenario if there was a clear 
understanding on the part of all these agencies (or 
in a higher agency that could coordinate them), 
that a high level of coordination was required. 
Without this coordination, the level of monitoring 
and enforcement was likely to be poor, with 
significant negative impacts on the outcomes of 
the policy support. 
From the perspective of foreign investors, the lack 
of coordination on the part of policy-makers also 
constituted a big hurdle for making effective long-
term investment decisions. The contradictory rates 
of tariffs on automobiles and components when 
the policy was to support domestic components 
industries has already been noted. Interviews 
suggested that the perception of automobile 
companies was that government policies were 
uncoordinated and unstable, and they could 
not make long-term decisions based on these 
policies. Tax rates for instance were subject to 
frequent changes, administrative procedures 
were complex, and there were also allegations 
of corruption, overlapping jurisdictions of 
agencies and so on. Generally, businesses in the 
sector argued that they did not find broad policy 
statements from government credible because 
the follow-up in detailed regulatory structures 
and policy instruments often did not happen in a 
timely and competent way.
These concerns about coordination and 
implementation continue to affect the new Vision 
2035 Statement announced by the Prime Minister 
on 16 July 2014 for the automobile industry 
(Pham et al., 2014). In principle, the revised 
strategy had many sound elements but doubts 
remained about how the contradictory aspects of 
the policy would be reconciled, the details spelled 
out, and implementation enforced. The new 
strategy recognized that there had to be a focus 
on particular technologies, and quite rightly, it 
focused on the medium technology segment of 
the automotive sector. For instance, it identified 
multi-purpose trucks suitable for agriculture 
and rural areas and small and medium-sized 
passenger cars appropriate for the local terrain 
and infrastructure conditions, which could be 
marketed at a reasonable price. For components, it 
also rightly identified the importance of focusing 
on a few specific products, such as actuators, 
gearbox components, engine components 
and so on, without attempting to produce the 
full range. The policy also took a more realistic 
position on localization than before, aiming 
for instance for a 30-40 percent localization in 
cars with up to nine seats by 2020. However, 
achieving competitiveness even in these limited 
segments will require coordination with major 
global companies so that Vietnamese production 
capabilities can improve and become part of their 
global supply chains. While the strategy statement 
identified some solutions and policies, for a 
programme of this level of ambition the solutions 
and policies were not sufficiently specific. 
Industry insiders were not very confident 
about the capacities of the Vietnamese state to 
define the policy details given the broad policy 
objectives identified in the vision statement, and 
then to implement these detailed policies. Some 
representatives pointed out that the statement 
used vague terminology linking taxes to qualities 
like ‘environmental friendliness’ or ‘fuel economy’. 
The detailed definition of these categories and 
the associated rates of tax and other incentives 
would determine whether the policy would 
achieve anything. Other representatives 
pointed out that the specific policies supporting 
component industries had not been identified 
and the viability of the policy would depend on 
whether the support was sufficient to attract 
new investments. The Viet Nam Automobile 
Manufacturers Association, VAMA, pointed out 
that not enough had been done to reduce the 
inconsistency of policies coming from the Ministry 
of Finance and the Ministry of Trade and Industry. 
Ford Viet Nam was concerned that a specific 
plan of action identifying long-term policies for 
improving competitiveness was missing. Finally, 
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the crucial question of the effective enforcement 
of conditions had not been addressed so the 
monitoring of companies receiving support was 
likely to remain as poor as before (Pham et al., 
2014). 
We have seen that the probability of policy 
success depends on the policy providing the right 
level and type of support for solving particular 
market failures, together with enforceable 
conditions to ensure public resources are not 
wasted. The scale of ambition in the new vision 
statement requires significant capabilities to 
define the types of instruments that could 
address particular market failures constraining 
the achievement of different objectives, and then 
selecting the instruments whose conditions of 
monitoring and enforcement were most likely to 
be effective given the enforcement capacities of 
the state. As the statement did not lay all this out, 
the likelihood is that the push and pull of different 
interests would result in a piecemeal rolling out of 
policies that will end up being both contradictory 
in its different parts as well as providing policy 
support without enforceable conditions. Given 
the weak enforcement capabilities of the relevant 
agencies in the past, it may make more sense for 
Vietnamese policy-makers to focus on a much less 
ambitious set of objectives to begin with. 
The weak enforcement capabilities of the state 
are particularly obvious in the motorcycle 
sector, which is paradoxically a sector that has 
done particularly well in Viet Nam. The share of 
the motorcycle industry in national industrial 
production grew from three percent in 2005 to 
24 percent in 2007. Even though the marketed 
brands are foreign owned, the domestic content 
in the components industries have steadily grown 
even though there is still a significant gap in the 
quality of domestic components producers and 
the globally competitive producers of these 
components. Nevertheless, even this qualified 
success was the product of an accidental set of 
circumstances that created the right pressures on 
rent recipients at a critical time (Ngo 2013). 
Like the automobile industry, the motorcycle 
industry enjoyed policy rents generated by 
tariffs and other policy instruments. From the 
mid-1990s onwards Japan’s Suzuki, Yamaha 
and Honda and Taiwan’s VMEP began to locate 
assembly operations in Viet Nam using imported 
components. Initially there was very little transfer 
of technical and organizational capabilities 
to local component producers. The transition 
happened through an unplanned shock, the 
so-called ‘China shock’ over 2001-2004 when 
lower quality and cheaper Chinese motorcycles 
flooded the Vietnamese market (Fujita, 2007). 
The Chinese motorcycles had two effects. First, 
these technologies were easier for Vietnamese 
component producers to imitate. Secondly, the 
Japanese companies suddenly discovered that the 
only way to compete with the Chinese imports was 
to reduce their costs by working with Vietnamese 
components producers to produce cheaper 
components than those imported from Japan. 
The presence of local market rents made it viable 
for the Japanese firms to invest in the capability 
development of their Vietnamese partners 
(instead of simply leaving). The localization did 
not come about because the Vietnamese state 
successfully ensured that access to local market 
rents depended on Japanese companies meeting 
enforceable localization conditions, but rather 
because Chinese competition forced them to do 
so, given the attractiveness of the rents in the 
domestic market created by tariff protection. 
This period led to the transfer of substantial 
organizational capabilities to Vietnamese 
components producers (Fujita, 2007; Ngo, 2013). 
From 2004 onwards, new brands of Japanese 
motorcycles had emerged that were cheap 
enough to ward off Chinese competition, and 
Vietnamese component producers entered at 
the lower levels of the components production 
chain. The motorcycle experience shows the role 
policy rents can play in making investments in 
capability development viable but it also shows 
that this does not necessarily happen without 
pressure on the rent recipients to make these 
investments and to enforce high levels of effort in 
the learning process. In the motorcycle case the 
pressure emerged through market competition 
with the Chinese at the right time. But if a policy 
framework has to be devised to support capability 
development in the automobile industry, 
the policy instruments providing support for 
investments in capability development have to be 
appropriately designed as another lucky external 
shock may not happen again. 
Given the policy formulation and implementation 
capabilities of a developing country state, a 
successful Vietnamese automotive strategy 
for the next decade or so has to make choices 
about where to focus policy attention. Too much 
ambition can result in too little being achieved. 
As the components that go into cars are largely 
produced by Tier 1 and 2 component industries, 
an integrated strategy for the automotive sector 
has to jointly consider the strategy for promoting 
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foreign original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) 
and their component producers, both local and 
multinational. The failure to develop a competitive 
domestic components industry has meant that 
the continuation of even limited tariff protection 
for imported components has resulted in high 
costs for assemblers by increasing the effective 
price of imported components. Not surprisingly, 
OEMs have put pressure on the government 
to further reduce tariffs and taxes on imported 
components so that the requisite components 
can be cheaply imported. This would help the 
assembly industry, but at the cost of making the 
Vietnamese automotive industry even more of 
an assembly industry. This may be progress given 
the current state of the industry, but does not lead 
to the development of a domestic components 
industry. The problem is that the development 
of a globally competitive components industry 
is the most likely way of generating a significant 
number of new jobs in the automotive sector, and 
therefore supporting the components industries 
should be an important part of an inclusive 
growth strategy (see Box 4).  
The first policy challenge is therefore to identify 
the contours of the broad policy that the country 
should follow in the automotive sector. Should 
Viet Nam focus on assembly of export-quality 
cars by foreign OEMs based on largely imported 
components, or should it try to build a domestic 
components industry? The former strategy involves 
reducing tariffs across the board. In contrast, the 
latter strategy involves providing incentives to 
attract assemblers who produce automobiles 
that use the greatest range of components that 
could potentially be manufactured by domestic 
components producers. The strategy of attracting 
these types of automobile OEMs would have to be 
combined with specific strategies of developing 
the capabilities of complementary domestic 
components manufacturers so that the latter 
can benefit from the access to export markets by 
means of supplying components to the foreign 
assembler. A lack of clarity on these broad policy 
choices can hamper the development of coherent 
support policies that business can understand 
and respond to in systematic ways. 
Given that a large number of countries are 
potentially competing to attract multinational 
companies in automobile assembly operations, 
including in the ASEAN region, a strategy that 
focuses on assembly is vulnerable to even 
lower wage countries tempting multinational 
assemblers away in the near future. The more 
sustainable strategy for a rising middle income 
country may be to develop domestic components 
production capabilities. This is desirable both 
from the perspective of broad-based growth 
because it creates opportunities for entry by 
new entrepreneurs and because it also makes 
the country more attractive for assemblers in 
the future if the components industries become 
globally competitive. The opportunity of sourcing 
components from local producers who are able to 
produce at global standards can lower sourcing 
costs and make particular countries attractive for 
locating assembly operations. 
For a relatively small country like Viet Nam, trying 
to simultaneously develop all of the components 
industries required for producing a complete 
car may not be feasible either in terms of scale 
economies, the quantum of support required 
or the time frame over which support would be 
required. It may be more feasible to identify and 
focus on a few critical automobile components 
in which Viet Nam could aim to become globally 
competitive through appropriate support policies 
and partnerships with foreign technology 
providers. However, there are implications for 
adopting such a strategy, because the payoffs 
would be over the longer term. Such a strategy 
may require incentives for particular types 
of assemblers and may also dissuade some 
assemblers from coming to Viet Nam in the 
immediate future because they may be worried 
that domestic support policies may affect the 
availability of competitive components for their 
assembly operations. 
Over the longer run, however, the emergence of a 
competitive components industry would enable 
a greater degree of imitation and clustering by 
emerging domestic entrepreneurs and thereby 
contribute to inclusive growth. This is likely 
to happen since the capital and technology 
requirements for entering an appropriately chosen 
segment of components production is much less 
demanding than attempting to produce an entire 
automobile. If such a strategy were to be adopted, 
considerable thought would have to be given 
to the selection of the appropriate segments 
of components that Viet Nam should attempt 
to competitively produce. Foreign technology 
providers could then be given specific ex post 
incentives to set up competitive production in 
these components sectors, with appropriate 
monitoring and implementation capabilities 
being developed on the side of government to 
ensure effective policy implementation to achieve 
these goals. Once Viet Nam becomes competitive 
in one or two automobile components with 
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significant domestic content, other components 
may follow, with the development of clusters of 
component industries that may eventually make 
it possible to achieve a high level of domestic 
content in automobile assembly in Viet Nam.
Clearly, different policies are called for depending 
on whether Viet Nam chooses a non-targeted 
assembly route or the components production 
route, which requires targeted support strategies. 
Developing a limited number of components 
industries may not be supported by the most 
advanced-technology automobile assemblers 
who are likely to prefer an immediate opening 
up of all components imports so that globally 
competitive automobiles can be immediately 
assembled in Viet Nam. However, a strategy of 
attracting these types of assemblers by adopting 
low tariff and tax policies without any other types 
of support for domestic components producers 
will undoubtedly slow down the development of 
the domestic components industries. These trade-
offs need to be explicitly discussed by policy-
makers so that consistent economic policies can 
be adopted. 
3. Electronics Industry
The electronics industry has been a dramatic 
success story in Viet Nam over the last few years 
with exponential growth after 2010 driven by 
very significant FDI inflows. Between 2007 and 
2011, employment in the sector doubled, with 
the employment across the sector reaching 
around half a million. The background to this was 
a significant shift in policy instruments that totally 
changed the allocation of rents from SOEs to FDI 
projects. Three phases in policy can be identified. 
In the first phase, from the opening up of the 
economy around 1990 to the early 2000s, 
significant rents were made available to the 
electronics industry in the form of low corporate 
taxes and high tariffs on imports of completed 
sets. These rents could only be accessed by 
forming joint ventures with SOEs as only SOEs 
had general trading rights and access to land. As 
a result, foreign investors had strong incentives 
to form joint ventures with SOEs as a way of 
accessing these rents. However, access to these 
rents for foreign investors did not come  with 
effective conditions that ensured the transfer of 
organizational capabilities to their Vietnamese 
partners. Although much technical knowledge 
was transferred through these joint ventures, 
competitive Vietnamese firms did not emerge 
over this period (Nguyen et al., 2014). 
It is not surprising why competitive SOEs did not 
emerge out of these joint ventures. The SOEs 
were organizations led by bureaucrats who did 
not necessarily see this opportunity as one of 
transforming their plants into competitive entities. 
There would have to be considerable pressure 
on such organizations to carry out the internal 
organizational changes and experimentation 
to achieve competitiveness. Nor did the foreign 
partners have any compelling reasons to exert 
time and effort in working with their SOE 
partners to enhance their competitiveness. The 
policy design did not link any of these rents to 
productivity outcomes. Rents were effectively an 
inducement to the foreign company to form a 
joint venture with the SOE rather than a policy-
created opportunity for creating competitive 
Vietnamese companies. 
The second phase from around 2000 to 2010 was 
characterized by trade and FDI liberalization that 
allowed foreign companies to directly access 
some of the rents without having to go through 
a Vietnamese SOE partner. In 1998 the restrictions 
on trading rights were lifted as part of the US-
Viet Nam Bilateral Trade Agreement. Full foreign 
ownership was allowed in export-oriented firms 
in 2000. Trade liberalization also happened over 
this period as tariffs were reduced as a result of 
WTO commitments and the ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement. The result of these changes was 
that foreign firms did not need an SOE partner 
to access rents, particularly those based on 
land allocation, and many of the joint ventures 
unravelled. Foreign investment strategy shifted 
to importing components for local assembly. 
Unfortunately, in many cases, the previous 
Vietnamese SOE partners discovered they did 
not have sufficient competitiveness to survive 
on their own. Growth in the sector was high 
over this period as a result of accelerated FDI 
investments in assembly operations, and export 
growth during 2002-2009 was around 30 percent 
annually. The downside was that Vietnamese 
capability development in the sector slowed 
down further and was even reversed in some areas 
(Nguyen et al., 2014).
The third phase, from around 2010 was 
characterized by an almost complete reversal of 
fortunes in terms of access to rents. Now foreign 
firms achieved privileged access to rents and 
domestic firms were left scraping the barrel, 
particularly in the private sector. An important 
policy reinforcing this reversal was a 2006 
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decision to delegate the task of evaluating and 
licensing FDI projects  from the central to the 
provincial governments. Provincial competition 
now led to a variety of incentives being offered to 
FDI projects, ranging from investment premiums 
and accelerated depreciation to tax holidays and 
reductions of land use fees. Out of 48 provinces 
surveyed by the Ministry of Finance, 32 granted 
extra incentives to investment projects. Most of 
the incentives were related to land or taxation. 
With respect to land, incentives included 
extended exemptions of land rent, subsidies 
for infrastructure, provision of land clearing 
and surfacing services at public expense, and 
preferential policy rents corresponding to the 
size of the project. In a 2011 survey conducted by 
UNIDO and the Vietnamese Ministry of Planning 
and Investment, it was found that most foreign 
investments in Viet Nam received tax breaks and 
land rent reductions while local firms did not. These 
policy rents for FDI investors did not come with 
any conditions for adding to local value added. 
However, the attractiveness of these rents and 
the locational decisions of many multinationals to 
relocate out of China led to an explosive period of 
growth for Viet Nam. The growth rate of electronics 
exports shot up to 96 percent in 2011 and in 2013 
electronics became the biggest export sector, 
leaving garments and textiles in second place 
(Nguyen et al., 2014). 
The firm structure in the electronics sector 
completely changed over this period. SOEs 
virtually disappeared in terms of significance 
and the sector became dominated by leading 
multinational companies like Intel, Samsung, 
Nokia and LG but with many small domestic private 
sector companies. The domestic electronics 
companies account for less than twenty percent 
of local market sales and five percent of exports. 
Domestic value added by the multinational 
companies is also limited because it is largely the 
value added by labour used in assembly activities, 
which may be as low as one to two percent of the 
sales value of the sector. Nevertheless, a total of 
around 500,000 people are employed in this sector, 
so there is considerable value added in aggregate 
(Nguyen et al., 2014). In terms of enhancing 
domestic value added and achieving inclusive 
growth, the sector faces similar policy challenges 
as the much less dynamic automobile sector. The 
huge growth in electronics exports is based largely 
on imported components being assembled by 
Vietnamese labour. Most domestic Vietnamese 
companies are too far away from competitive 
capabilities to be significant suppliers in the 
production chain of the very advanced original 
equipment manufacturer (OEM) products that 
dominate the product mix in the sector. So the 
policy question is how to enhance the role of 
domestic component suppliers?
A historic comparison of productivity with regional 
competitors in Figure 5 suggests that Viet Nam has 
been largely engaged in the lower value-added 
assembly stages of the electronics industry. Also 
the gaps in value added per employee compared 
to other regional competitors remain significant 
as Figure 5 suggests. Should Viet Nam focus 
on its apparent comparative advantage as an 
assembly country, reducing taxes and providing 
incentives to more OEM brands like Samsung 
to come to Viet Nam? Or should it plan for the 
longer term to develop its own components 
clusters, which would not be competitive to 
begin with and would require sustained periods 
of support and capability development? At the 
moment, it is clear that Viet Nam is relying on the 
first strategy. The consequence is that the gap 
between the quality of components demanded 
by the OEMs and the capabilities of domestic 
Vietnamese component producers is rapidly 
increasing. While some of the more sophisticated 
domestic components producers, particularly 
those with a history of linkages with the OEM 
brands may hope to benefit, most Vietnamese 
components producers are unlikely to do so. This 
means that the presence of the multinational 
OEMs may not translate into inclusive growth 
without supportive government policies for the 
components industries. 
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Figure 5   Manufacturing Value Added per Employee in Electronics (USD)
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Here too, the choices facing the electronics 
sector are similar to those facing the automotive 
industry. It is unlikely that Viet Nam will be able 
to develop the full range of component industries 
that are required to produce, say, a mobile 
phone of the quality produced by Samsung. The 
policy task would be to attract the assembly 
of electronics products where the technology 
and sophistication of the components required 
are close enough to the capabilities of existing 
Vietnamese producers for a viable technical and 
organizational upgrading strategy to be feasible. 
The second stage would be to develop policy 
instruments for supporting these components 
producers in ways that were effective. The policy 
may require being selective about the types 
of foreign technology investors who should 
be offered the significant rents to relocate to 
Viet Nam. Priority should be given to attract 
those OEMs whose supply chain has significant 
segments where a country with Viet Nam’s level of 
capabilities in electronics could enter. The policies 
for attracting these multinational investors would 
have to be complemented with additional policies 
supporting capability development in selected 
components industries. The two sets of policies 
would have to be simultaneously implemented 
with an enforcement of necessary conditions. 
Conversely, the alternative of supporting every 
multinational investor who expressed an interest 
in Viet Nam with significant policy rents may 
not be the best use of public resources, and 
may result in very slow progress in terms of 
inclusive growth.
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The challenge for inclusive growth strategies is 
to design policies that can effectively overcome 
the relevant market failures constraining growth. 
Effective policies also have to ensure that support 
is not wasted by identifying necessary conditions 
that can be monitored and enforced in the 
political and institutional context of the country. 
Our discussion of the underlying issues and the 
examples of previous policy experiences in three 
sectors help to identify a number of broad themes 
to inform policy design:
First, it is clear that the challenges of addressing 
broadly defined goals can be quite complex, 
both in terms of understanding the relevant 
economic constraints, and also in terms 
of designing policy so that the necessary 
enforcement conditions are met. Developing 
countries like contemporary Viet Nam have 
limited policy space and limited capabilities of 
enforcement and coordination. Policies targeting 
particular sectors should be simple and should 
target a small number of issues at any one time. 
More ambitious policies are less likely to deliver 
results because contradictions are likely to emerge 
between different instruments, and enforcement 
is likely to suffer as a result of coordination failures. 
A second feature that has characterized the 
experiences in all of our sectors is that the 
Vietnamese state has found it difficult to 
monitor and enforce conditions on large 
ex ante rents allocated to a wide range 
of companies. 
Finally, coordination across agencies and 
between centre and provinces has been a 
problem for designing the right allocations of 
rents with the right conditions to achieve the 
desired objectives. 
These observations suggest that it may be 
necessary for Vietnamese policy-makers 
to consider more narrowly defined but 
coordinated policies of promoting inclusive 
growth in particular sectors. 
What might such policies entail? The details would 
depend on an assessment of the magnitude of 
the competitiveness gap in different medium-
technology component industries to identify 
segments of the components industries that 
would be feasible for Viet Nam to try to enter with 
a strategy of capability development. At a general 
level, we know that Vietnamese manufacturing 
sectors suffer from low levels of competitiveness 
(Central Institute for Economic Management, 
General Statistics Office, & Development 
Economics Research Group University of 
Copenhagen, 2014; Coxhead, Phan, Dinh, & Ninh, 
2010; Nixson & Walters, 2010). Policy formulation 
requires more specific studies of particular 
components industries to identify gaps in the cost 
of production of products of specific qualities, 
relative to competitors. 
Capability development strategies will be 
more challenging the greater the initial 
competitiveness gap. It makes sense to 
begin with less ambitious strategies, which 
means identifying segments of components 
production where the competitiveness gap 
is initially not too great. It is most likely that 
developing countries like Viet Nam will find it 
easier to achieve competitiveness in relatively 
low technology segments of components 
production, in line with the experiences of China 
and other rapidly industrializing countries (see 
Box 1). This observation is likely to be contrary 
to the expectations of many policy-makers who 
may think that the best strategy is to emulate 
and adopt the most advanced segments of 
components production. The problem is that 
such attempts are likely to take long periods of 
policy support to a small number of firms, and 
the monitoring and enforcement capabilities 
may fail to ensure that these rent allocations will 
pay off. Moreover, moving up the productivity 
ladder is more likely to be successful for firms 
that have already achieved productivity in lower 
technology segments of production. This type of 
organic growth of firms is more sustainable as a 
long-term strategy for countries like Viet Nam, 
VI. Policy Options for Improved  
     Inclusive Growth Strategies 
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and is also more compatible with an inclusive 
growth strategy. 
Viet Nam has been very successful in attracting 
FDI and it makes sense to leverage this success in 
developing medium technology industries that 
can be linked to global value chains through the 
foreign companies already operating in Viet Nam. 
This requires policy clarity about the segments 
and technologies to prioritize, and it also requires 
limiting the number of sectors and technologies 
that policy is attempting to promote. Otherwise, 
as we have seen, policy contradictions can emerge 
as a result of attempting to achieve multiple 
objectives with a limited number of instruments. 
Figure 6 summarizes some of the observations 
made in previous sections about the necessity 
of coordinating policies for attracting higher 
technology investments with strategies for 
developing medium-technology component 
industries. The two objectives require different 
sets of rents allocated with different conditions, 
and these policies need to be coordinated. Arrow 
A shows that attracting the appropriate FDI 
can be assisted by offering targeted incentives 
for attracting types of higher technology 
assembly operations that are most likely to 
create opportunities for domestic components 
production. This would require a strategy of 
offering incentives but only to particular foreign 
technology providers, selected on the basis of the 
appropriateness of their products for developing 
feasible domestic components producing supply 
chains. 
Figure 6  Interlinked Policy Rents for Technology Acquisition and Capability 
Development
COORDINATION ACROSS AGENCIES MANAGING THE THREE POLICY RENTS TO AVOID ENFORCEMENT FAILURES
Support for domestic components 
industries to develop capabilities 
through learning-by-doing and if 
necessary skills development 
Select FDI that supports feasible 
components industries given initial 
capabilities 
Ex ante policy rents for 
skills development and 
learning-by-doing 
Ex post rents (prizes) to 
foreign technology providers to 
develop competitive components 
industry 
Rents for attracting targeted 
higher technology investors 
Investments by foreign partner in 
capability development of domestic 
components suppliers supported by 




At the same time policy has to support 
the development of competitive domestic 
capabilities in selected segments of medium-
technology production. This in turn can involve 
two different types of policy rents. Arrow B shows 
the more usual policy of providing ex ante rents 
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to emerging firms, both as part of a capability 
development strategy and for financing skills 
development. However, each has different 
conditions that need to be enforced and if these 
conditions are unlikely to be enforced, there is 
no point in such an ex ante support strategy. An 
alternative and possibly complementary support 
strategy is shown by the two arrows marked C. 
Here policy support is provided to the foreign 
investor in the form of an ex post prize that is only 
accessible if the investor succeeds in developing 
the capabilities of domestic components 
suppliers. The ex post prize could take the form 
of performance related fees that could be offered 
to the foreign partner for achieving specific goals 
such as raising the competitiveness of domestic 
components suppliers to the point where they 
are able to integrate into the supply chain of the 
OEMs. 
The objective of such contracts would be to 
induce the investor to invest in developing the 
capabilities of the relevant suppliers and the 
investment is rewarded with appropriately large 
ex post prizes if and when success is achieved. The 
details of the contract would have to be carefully 
negotiated, and in some cases significant up-
front cost sharing may be necessary to induce the 
foreign partner to participate in the scheme. This 
may be necessary, for instance, in cases where 
the initial capabilities of domestic components 
producers were relatively low. The advantage 
of ex post rent contracts is that the monitoring 
of the learning effort associated with the rent is 
much less because the investors have a strong 
incentive in ensuring that the desired outcomes 
are achieved to access the promised ex post rents. 
We have seen that variants of such ex post rent 
strategies have been successful in developing 
competitive component industries in a number 
of countries (Box 4). Nevertheless, here too some 
conditions have to be set and enforced by the 
state to ensure that capability development in 
new areas is achieved. 
The policy package for supporting inclusive 
growth in a sector can therefore include more than 
one type of rent, but the different rents shown in 
Figure 6 have to be coordinated if they are not 
to operate at cross purposes. The policy design 
and the types of rents involved would depend 
on the specific technologies, types of investors 
and the initial capabilities of stakeholders in that 
sector. Policy analysis at the inception stage can 
help to reduce the chances of failures, but policy 
analysis cannot remove the possibility of failure 
entirely. This is why policy-makers also have to be 
ready to experiment with small-scale trials. Small-
scale trials of particular mechanisms of support, 
beginning with a small number of firms in a sector, 
is vital to test whether the initial competitiveness 
gap and learning capabilities of domestic firms 
were correctly assessed and the appropriate 
success criteria identified. Policy design also 
has to test if the specification of rewards and 
penalties are appropriate given the monitoring 
and enforcement capacities of the state. Success 
can be scaled up, but it may also be necessary to 
modify or even reverse some policies as evidence 
on outcomes comes in. The evidence of successful 
technology policies in East Asia and China (Box 3) 
shows the importance of experimentation and 
trials, and the appropriate scaling of the initial 
policy so that it could be modified in the light of 
experience. 
The different components of a successful rent 
management policy can now be summarized. 
First, policy has to identify the market failures 
constraining the competitiveness of Vietnamese 
producers in potential medium-technology 
sectors as well as the market failures that may 
constrain investments by foreign technology 
providers who require these suppliers. As Figure 
1 summarized earlier, this involves identifying the 
critical contracting failures constraining growth 
in these related sectors and then designing 
policies so the required conditions for policy 
success are enforceable. As policies create and 
allocate rents, and require conditions imposed 
on rent recipients to achieve desired outcomes, 
a successful policy-making process is effectively 
an exercise in feasible rent management. Figure 6 
shows that a successful inclusive growth strategy 
based on combining FDI investments with 
domestic capability development is likely to have 
to coordinate different types of rents allocated or 
offered to different firms with specific enforceable 
conditions. Thus, policy may have to provide 
incentives to foreign technology providers of 
particular types to locate in the country, and it 
may also have to assist strategies for developing 
the capabilities of medium-technology 
domestic components producers linked to those 
investments. 
Figure 6 can be used to structure the policy 
discussion in particular sectors by allowing us 
to highlight the different types of policies that 
may be required and the feasibility of designing 
policies in particular ways. For example, in the case 
of garments and textiles, the strategy would be to 
attract foreign firms that were moving up the value 
chain into design, marketing and research, and 
Supporting Inclusive Growth - Effective Policy Design for Developing  Medium Technology Sectors 45
were shifting out of their own high-productivity 
production activities. Policy would have to 
consider incentives for such partners to transfer 
their production activities to local partners, but 
significantly, provide them with incentives for 
transferring organizational and technical know-
how to local production firms. The rent policy, 
following Arrow C in Figure 6, may be to provide 
a substantial reward, appropriately calibrated, to 
the foreign technology provider to assist one or 
more domestic companies to set up production 
lines, inventory management systems, quality 
control arrangements and marketing networks 
to ensure the achievement of competitiveness. 
The foreign investor could be offered a limited 
return during the experiment but a substantial ex 
post performance fee or prize if the Vietnamese 
company started exporting or integrated into the 
higher value segments of the supply chain of the 
foreign partner company. The rent management 
capability required of the state would be to define 
and assess success appropriately and release the 
reward only when performance criteria were 
met. This type of approach would have to be 
fine-tuned in its details, but the point is that the 
monitoring and enforcement requirements for 
the rents would be much lower in this case, while 
still creating incentives for the development of 
organizational capabilities. The emergence of the 
Indian automobile industry or the Bangladeshi 
garments industry are applied examples of such 
strategies. 
In the Vietnamese automobile or electronics 
cases, much more attention would have to 
be given to the overall strategy as discussed 
in earlier sections. For instance, coordination 
failures can be reduced significantly if strategic 
coherence was achieved over whether to focus 
on immediately assembling the most advanced 
cars or on attracting only those types of car 
assemblers which allowed the development 
of particular domestic components industries. 
In each case, the types of foreign technology 
investments that need to be attracted would be 
different. Our hypothesis is that a components-
based approach is likely to deliver better long-
term results for inclusive growth. If the goal was to 
sequentially build up capabilities in components 
industries, the appropriate technologies to 
attract would be assemblers whose components 
subcontracting requirements were at the right 
level of technological sophistication for parts 
to be feasibly subcontracted to local medium-
technology producers. A components industry 
development strategy would therefore be likely 
to involve specific strategies of using type A, B and 
C rents in Figure 6, and coordination and policy 
coherence would be much more important. In 
contrast, a strategy of attracting a wide variety of 
automobile assemblers would be quite different 
because under this strategy all assemblers 
would want low-tax imported components and 
may oppose any targeted strategies promoting 
capability development in particular domestic 
companies.
A similar set of questions arises in the electronics 
industry. A components-based approach would 
have to use type A rents much more carefully to 
attract particular components manufacturers or 
assemblers who were just advanced enough in 
the technical sophistication of their production 
to be able to engage in subcontracting to local 
producers in the presence of incentives of types 
B and C in Figure 6. 
The discussion in this paper shows that theory 
and international evidence suggests that policies 
can be designed better to support inclusive 
growth strategies in developing countries but 
they require greater attention to coherence and 
policy design. Effective policies have to identify 
and address the important contracting failures 
constraining growth, and they also have to link 
policy support to enforceable conditions to 
ensure that the policy support is more likely to 
be successful.
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